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# **New book from Yutopian Enterprises**

## ***A Journey in Search of the Origins of Go***

*by Shirakawa Masayoshi*

An English translation of a book first published by the Nihon Ki-in in 1999. The author describes his numerous trips to China, where he investigated the origins of go. He shows the deep relationship between go and *Yi Jing* (also known as *I Ching*), the Chinese classic on divination. His main thesis is that the go board and stones were initially used as a tool for divination. He also shows how the Chinese calendar is closely related to the go board. Shirakawa cites numerous sources from Chinese history and literature as evidence for his theories.

Having personally worked with Go Seigen and attended many of his lectures, the author relates Go Seigen's theories on and insights into the origins of go.

One of the main contributions of this book for western go players is its thorough analysis of the rule of *kirichin*. In ancient China, where this rule was used, the players would fill in their territories at the end of the game until all of one player's groups were left with only two eyes. The player who still had territory left to fill was the winner. In this method of counting, connecting two groups was worth two points.

The main chapters are:

Chapter One. Go and *Three Kingdoms*

Chapter Two. The Origins and Philosophy of Go

Chapter Three. The Evolution of the Methods of Counting

Chapter Four. Go Strategy

Also included are a 5,000-year chronology of go in China and Japan, from ancient times to the present, and an extensive bibliography.

Shirakawa is a literary critic and writer. He is a lecturer at Kokugakuin University and Tokyo Keizai University. Among his works are *In Search of Dostoevsky* and *Complete Critical Essay on Hanaya Yutaka*. He was the chief editor of *Conversations on Go with Go Seigen* and the author of *Go is about Dividing*.

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*The cover:* The center panel of an oban triptych by Kunisada published in 1818. Actor Ichikawa Danjuro VII performs the role of Sakata Hyogonosuke Kintoki in *Yama Mata Yama Oyozume-Banashi* (The Tale of a Noble Guardman), staged at the Tamagawa Theater in Edo. Kunisada depicts the scene where the spirit of Ground Spider (Segawa Kikunojo V, left panel) appears in front of Kintoki and Urabe no Suetake (Matsumoto Koshiro V, right panel), playing a game of go. From the collection of Erwin Gerstorfer.

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# Go World News

Late April~July 2006

by John Power



*The victorious Chinese team in the CSK Cup*

## International

### Commemorative stamp for Gu Li

Besides the automatic promotion to 9-dan, Gu Li received a more unusual reward for his victory in the 10th LG Cup (reported in GW107). To commemorate the success, the Chinese post office issued a special stamp showing Gu holding his trophy.

### China wins 5th CSK Cup

Last year the Okinawan-sponsored CSK Cup went overseas for the first time, moving to Seoul. This year it was held in the hot spring resort of Beppu in Kyushu from 1 to 3 May. The result was yet another international triumph for China, which won all three of its matches, including a 3-2 victory over Korea. The latter actually scored the same number of individual wins as China, but match wins are the main determinant, so China won the CSK Cup for the second time.

The individual stars were the four players who won all their games: Kong Jie and Xie He for China, Pak Yeong-hun for Korea, and Cho U for Chinese Taipei. The only consolation for

Japan was that Yoda Norimoto scored another win over his archrival Yi Ch'ang-ho, but that was the only win his team picked up in its match with Korea.

Although Chinese Taipei placed last, it actually came within an ace of defeating the eventual winner in the first round when the only locally-based player on the team, Chen Shiyuan, lost by just half a point to Xie He.

Pairings are decided by drawing lots, but, as it turned out, the two undefeated teams met on the last day, so the tournament couldn't have been staged better.

### Full results

#### Round One (1 May)

*Korea vs. Japan: 4-1*

Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (B) lost to Yoda Norimoto 9-dan by 2½.

Yi Se-tol 9-dan (W) beat Takao Shinji 9-dan by 9½.

Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan (B) beat Yamashita Keigo 9-dan by resig.

Ko Keun-t'ae 5-dan (W) beat Yuki Satoshi 9-dan by resig.



Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan (B) beat Kono Rin 8-dan by resig.

*China vs. Chinese Taipei: 3-2*

Gu Li 9-dan (W) lost to Cho U 9-dan by 5½.

Chang Hao 9-dan (B) lost to Han Zenki 7-dan by resig.

Ding Wei 8-dan (W) beat O Rissei 9-dan by resig.

Kong Jie 7-dan (B) beat O Meien 9-dan by resig.

Xie He 6-dan (W) beat Chen Shiyuan 5-dan by ½.

### Round Two (2 May)

*Korea vs. Chinese Taipei: 4-1*

Ch'oe (B) lost to Cho by resig.

Yi Se-tol (W) beat O Meien by resig.

Yi Ch'ang-ho (B) beat Han by resig.

Pak (W) beat O Rissei by resig.

Ko (B) beat Chen by resig.

*China vs. Japan: 4-1*

Chang (W) beat Takao by 3½.

Kong (B) beat Yoda by 1½.

Xie (W) beat Yuki by 1½.

Gu (B) beat Yamashita by resig.

Ding (W) lost to Kono by resig.

### Round 3 (3 May)

*China vs. Korea: 3-2*

Gu (B) beat Yi Se-tol by resig.

Chang (W) lost to Yi Ch'ang-ho by resig.

Kong (B) beat Ko by resig.

Xie (W) beat Ch'oe by 14½.

Ding (B) lost to Pak by ½.

*Japan vs. Chinese Taipei: 4-1.*

Takao (W) lost to Cho by resig.

Yamashita (B) beat O Rissei by 2½.

Yuki (W) beat Chen by 4½.

Kono (B) beat Han by resig.

Yoda (W) beat O Meien by resig.

1st) China: 3-0, 10 wins

2nd) Korea: 2-1, 10 wins

3rd) Japan: 1-2, 6 wins

4th) Chinese Taipei: 0-3, 4 wins

### New Korean star Pak wins 19th Fujitsu Cup

Korea has yet another new star: the 21-year-old Pak Cheong-sang 6-dan. For once, this year, there was a little bit of pressure on Korea, as it had not yet had any success in the international arena — China had won the LG Cup and the CSK Cup and Japan had won the Nong Shim Cup. Having won the Fujitsu Cup eight years in a row, Korea was still the favourite, but the player who came through for it was the previously unsung Pak, who was making his debut in the Fujitsu Cup.

When this year's tournament started, Pak was

a virtual unknown in Japan, and no one here would have tipped him as the eventual winner. Perhaps not in Korea either — at the quarterfinals, held in Beijing, Cho Hun-hyeon had told a Japanese reporter that Pak was just one member of a group of about 20 to 30 players in Korea who were hot on the heels of the top quartet (the two Yis, Ch'oe Ch'eol-han and Pak Yeong-hun).



*Pak holds his trophy.*

In the second round, Pak defeated Hane Naoki of Japan, then disposed of Chang Hao of China in the quarterfinals. In the semifinals, he bested his compatriot and one of the favourites Ch'oe Ch'eol-han, setting up a Korea-China clash in the final. Here he scored a convincing win over Zhou Heyang of China.

Previously, Pak's best international results were reaching the best eight in the 6th Samsung Cup in 2001 (in just his second year as a professional) and in the 10th LG Cup in 2005. He only qualified for this tournament because Korea had a number of seeded places and he had a high position in the prize-money rankings; in other words, he was lucky even to be in the tournament. Now that he has made the big breakthrough, it will be interesting to see if he turns the top quartet into a quintet. If he does — and if what Cho Hun-hyeon said about that group of rivals is true — that's going to make things even tougher for Korea's opponents.

### Quarterfinals (Beijing, 3 June)

Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Yuki Satoshi 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) (B) d. Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan (Korea) by ½; Yi





*Yamashita Keigo of Japan (L) loses to Hu Yaoyu of China in the LG Cup.*

Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) by 4½; Pak Cheong-sang 5-dan (Korea) (W) d. Chang Hao 9-dan (China) by resig.

**Semifinals** (Nihon Ki-in, 1 July)

Pak (W) d. Ch'oe by resig.; Zhou (W) d. Yi by resig.

**Final** (Nihon Ki-in, 3 July)

Pak (W) d. Zhou by resig.

**Play-off for 3rd place** (Nihon Ki-in, 3 July)

Ch'oe (B) d. Yi by resig.

**Korea and China do well in LG Cup**

The opening rounds of the 11th LG Cup were held in Seoul on 15 and 17 May. Last year the tournament was dominated by China, which took six of the quarterfinal places; however, this year Korea made a recovery, taking four places to China's three. The remaining place went to Chinese Taipei, so for the second year in a row Japan was shut out.

Perhaps the most notable results are those of Chen Yao, the 16-year-old finalist in the 10th Cup; he has shown that that was no fluke by winning both his games, including one against a member of the Korean top four, Ch'oe Ch'eol-han. The reigning champion, Gu Li, is also doing well.

Incidentally, two of the Japanese representatives, So Yokoku and Ko Iso, won their places in the preliminary tournament held in Seoul from 24 April. In this tournament, 256 professionals competed for the 16 nonseeded places in the main tournament.

The quarterfinals are scheduled for October.

**Round 1** (15 May, Seoul)

Kono Rin 8-dan (Japan) (W) d. Pak Seung-hyeon 5-dan (Korea) by ½; Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Yun Chun-sang 4-dan (Korea) by 2½; Takao Shinji 9-dan (Japan) (B) d. Wang Lei 5-dan (China) by resig.; Cho Han-seung 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) by 6½; Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Ch. Taipei) d. Ko Iso 7-dan (Japan) by resig.; Lin Zhihan 7-dan (Ch. Taipei) (B) d. So Yokoku 8-dan (Japan) by 3½; Chen Yaoye 5-dan (China) (W) d. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Huang Yizhong 6-dan (China) by 3½; Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (W) d. Ch'oe Myeong-hun 9-dan (Korea) by 9½; Ko Keun-t'ae 5-dan (Korea) (B) d. Wang Xi 5-dan (China) by resig.; Gu Li 9-dan (China) (W) d. Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Chang Hao 9-dan (China) by resig.; Xie He 6-dan (China) (W) d. Chin Si-yeong 2-dan (Korea) by resig.; Hu Yaoyu 8-dan (China) d. Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) by 5½; Kim Tong-heui 2-dan (Korea) (W) d. Ding Wei 8-dan (China) by 1½; Hong Min-p'yo 5-dan (Korea) d. Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) by 1½.

**Round 2** (17 May, Seoul).

Xie (W) d. Yi Se-tol by resig.; Gu (B) d. Ko by resig.; Zhou (W) d. Takao by resig.; Hu (B) d. Yamashita by 3½; Chen (W) d. Kim by resig.; Hong (B) d. Lin by 3½; Yi Ch'ang-ho (B) d. Kono by 1½; Cho (W) d. Yu by 11½.

**Hiraoka wins 27th World Amateur Go Championship**

When Hiraoka Satoshi of Japan suffered a loss on time in his fourth-round game with Jo Tae-won of DPR Korea, his prospects of winning the tournament didn't look good. However, he didn't slip up a second time. In the final round,



he defeated the tournament leader, the 13-year-old Tang Weixing of China; this threw the tournament into a multiple draw for first place, with four players on 7-1, but Hiraoka prevailed thanks to a superior SOS score and so he pulled off a dramatic come-from-behind victory. This was his second WAGC win.

This year there was a record entry of 68 countries in the tournament, which was held from 28 to 31 May in the holiday resort of Huis Ten Bosch, near Sasebo in Kyushu. Western participants were probably bemused to come to Japan and find themselves in a faithful — and astonishingly large-scale — reproduction of a Dutch town.

The prizewinners are listed below. The Shizuoka Asada Fighting Spirit Prize was awarded to Vesa Laatikainen of Finland, who defeated the Taiwanese representative in the fifth round.

- 1st) Hiraoka Satoshi (Japan): 7-1
- 2nd) Tang Weixing (China): 7-1
- 3rd) Jo Tae-won (DPR Korea): 7-1
- 4th) Hong Man-ki (Korea): 7-1
- 5th) Chan Naisan (Hong Kong China): 6-2
- 6th) Joey Hung (USA): 6-2
- 7th) Cristian Pop (Romania): 6-2
- 8th) Ondrej Silt (Czechia): 6-2
- 9th) Christoph Gerlach (Germany): 6-2
- 10th) Yong Fei Ge (Canada): 6-2.

#### Current international champions

- 5th Ing Cup: Chang Hao (China)
- 2nd Toyota & Denso Cup: Yi Se-tol (Korea)
- 19th Fujitsu Cup: Pak Cheong-sang (Korea)
- 10th Samsung Cup: Luo Xihe (China)
- 5th Chunlan Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)
- 10th LG Cup: Gu Li (China)
- 17th TV Asia Cup: Cho U (Japan)
- 2nd Zhonghuan Cup: Ch'oe Ch'eol-han (Korea)
- 7th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup: Japan
- 5th CSK Cup: China
- 4th Cheongkwanjang Cup: China

#### Most world championships won

- 20: Yi Ch'ang-ho (+ 2 invitationals)
- 11: Cho Hun-hyeon
- 6: Takemiya Masaki, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok, Yi Se-tol
- 4: Yoda Norimoto
- 3: Yu Bin
- 2: Otake Hideo, Ma Xiaochun, O Rissei, Cho Chikun, Pak Yeong-hun, Cho U
- 1: Kobayashi Koichi, Rin Kaiho,

Seo Pong-su, Zhou Heyang,  
Chang Hao, Ch'oe Ch'eol-han,  
Luo Xihe, Gu Li, Pak Cheong-sang

(By country) Korea: 48; Japan: 20;  
China: 9

Team championships (Jinro, Nong Shim, Igo Asia/CSK)

Korea: 13      Japan: 2      China: 2

## News from Japan



*Takao defends the Honinbo title.*

### Takao defends 61st Honinbo title

Takao Shinji has completed his first defence of the Honinbo title that he won from Cho U last year. The challenger was Yamada Kimio 9-dan of Osaka, which made the match the first East-West Honinbo contest for 44 years, that is, since Handa Dogen of the Kansai Ki-in challenged Sakata Eio in the 17th title match in 1962. In fact, Yamada was the first player ever from the Osaka headquarters of the Nihon Ki-in to challenge for a big-three title. For the second year in a row, however, following the failure of Yuki Satoshi's Kisei challenge last year, the hopes of Osakan fans for a big title were disappointed.

Takao started well, taking a 3-1 lead. Yamada made an excellent fightback in the fifth game, but succumbed in the sixth.

Game 1 (8, 9 May). Takao (W) by resig.

Game 2 (29, 30 May). Yamada (W) by resig.





*Yamada's hopes revived when he saved the kadoban, but he was unable to take his first Honinbo challenge the full distance. The players try to work out where he went wrong in the sixth game.*

Game 3 (7, 8 June). Takao (W) by resig.  
 Game 4 (12, 13 June). Takao (B) by resig.  
 Game 5 (26, 27 June). Yamada (B) by resig.  
 Game 6 (11, 12 July). Takao (B) by resig.

#### Top title winners (10+)

|                      |                         |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| 69: Cho Chikun       | 18: Takagawa Shukaku    |
| 64: Sakata Eio       | 15: Shimamura Toshihiro |
| 59: Kobayashi Koichi | 14: Yamashiro Hiroshi   |
| 48: Otake Hideo      | 13: Cho U               |
| 47: Kato Masao       | 12: Hashimoto Utaro,    |
| 35: Rin Kaiho, Yoda  | Hane Naoki              |
| Norimoto             | 10: Sugiuchi Kazuko,    |
| 24: Ishida Yoshio,   | Kobayashi Reiko,        |
| Takemiya Masaki      | Kobayashi Izumi,        |
| 23: Fujisawa Shuko   | Aoki Kikuyo,            |
| 22: O Rissei         | Yamashita Keigo         |

Also: Takao Shinji: 8

#### Prize money for Japanese titles

1. Kisei: ¥42,000,000
2. Meijin: ¥36,000,000
3. Honinbo: ¥32,000,000
4. Toyota & Denso Cup: ¥30,000,000
5. Fujitsu Cup, NEC Cup: ¥15,000,000
7. Judan: ¥14,000,000
8. Tengen, Oza: ¥13,500,000
10. Gosei: ¥7,770,000

#### Cho U wins Gosei title

In the play-off to decide the challenger for the 31st Gosei title, held on 8 June, Cho U Mei-

jin (B) defeated Yamashita Keigo Kisei by 2½ points and so earned the right to make his first challenge for the Gosei title. Cho has done well against the titleholder, Yoda Norimoto, in the past, having a career record against him of 15 wins to 9 losses and defeating him in both the Honinbo and Meijin title matches in 2004.

Cho's ascendancy over Yoda continued in the title match, which he won three-straight, though in the first game he scraped home by just half a point. The one-sided result was surprising, but it was not so much that Yoda was in bad form, rather that Cho was at his best.

Cho now holds a triple crown: Meijin, Oza (literally, the Crown) and Gosei.

Game 1 (6 July). Cho (B) by ½.

Game 2 (12 July). Cho (W) by resig.

Game 3 (27 July). Cho (B) by 2½.

#### Iyama wins 3rd Nakano Cup

The Nakano Cup is a private tournament founded by the late Nakano Koji and organized by *Go Weekly*. It is open to teenaged professionals and inseis. First prize is ¥1,000,000.

The final of the 3rd Cup was held on 8 July. The favourite was Iyama Yuta 7-dan, who has established himself as the top teenaged professional in Japan. His opponent was Xie Yimin 3-dan; born on 16 November 1989, she is slightly



**31st Meijin league** (8 December 2005 to August 2006)

Title-holder: Cho U

| Rank | Player/opponent  | KS | YK | IT | YK | SH | YN | TS | HZ | KI | Score |
|------|------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| 1    | Kobayashi Satoru | —  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  |    | 3-4   |
| 2    | Yamashita Keigo  | 0  | —  | 1  | 1  | 1  |    | 0  | 0  | 1  | 4-3   |
| 3    | Imamura Toshiya  | 1  | 0  | —  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 2-6   |
| 4    | Yamada Kimio     | 1  | 0  | 1  | —  |    | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 4-3   |
| 5    | Sakai Hideyuki   | 1  | 0  | 1  |    | —  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 4-3   |
| 6    | Yoda Norimoto    | 0  |    | 1  | 1  | 0  | —  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 4-3   |
| 7    | Takao Shinji     | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | —  |    | 1  | 5-2   |
| 7    | Han Zenki        | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  |    | —  | 1  | 4-3   |
| 7    | Ko Iso           |    | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | —  | 2-5   |

younger than Iyama, who was born on 24 May of the same year. Xie, who hails from Taiwan, became a professional at the Nihon Ki-in in 2004, and has already made her mark in the women's go world. She has yet to take a title but has been doing well in tournaments; she has already become well known for her style: she is extremely aggressive and is always seeking to start a fight.

In the final, however, Iyama, who had black, demonstrated greater expertise, parrying Xie's fierce attacks with ease. The latter resigned after 233 moves. Iyama won the title for the second year in a row (Seto Taiki of the Kansai Ki-in won the inaugural title).

**Oza challenger: Yamashita or Kobayashi Satoru**

Yamashita Keigo fought four title matches in a row from autumn last year through to spring this year. Now he is bidding to make another challenge, as he has reached the final of the 54th Oza title. In the first semifinal, held on 20 July, he defeated Ryu Shikun (W) by half a point.

In the other semifinal, held on 27 July, Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan (B) defeated Iyama Yuta 7-dan by half a point, which gave him some revenge for his Agon Kiriya Cup final loss to Iyama last year. This result may have disappointed Japanese go fans, who are looking forward to the 18-year-old Iyama's first top-seven title challenge.

**New Chairman Okabe Hiromu and Kobayashi Koichi join Nihon Ki-in board**

In the period of just over one and a half years since the sudden death of Kato Masao, the post of Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in has remained vacant, with Kudo Norio filling in as Acting Chairman. On 11 July, Okabe Hiromu, the Chairman of Denso Incontro-

rated, was appointed Chairman (as of 30 July). At a press conference, Okabe commented that the Nihon Ki-in was faced with daunting problems, such as the declining go population and the parlous state of the Nihon Ki-in's finances, but also said that the Nihon Ki-in had a mission to pass on the culture of Japanese go to the next generation.

Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan has always given his playing career top priority, but, at the age of 53, he has now branched out a bit. On 30 July, he assumed the post of Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in. We hope this is not a sign that he has given up on winning any more titles.

**Two marriages**

Yuki Satoshi 9-dan married the daughter of Hotta Yozo 9-dan, a fellow member of the Kansai Ki-in, on 9 June. His wife, Kanako, was an insei until March; she had joined Yuki's study group two years ago.

On 11 July, Yashiro Kumiko, Women's Honinbo, married Kanazawa Hideo 7-dan on 11 July. They are the 15th married couple among Nihon Ki-in professionals.

**Takao leads Meijin League**

After seven rounds, Takao Shinji Honinbo has a clear lead in the 31st Meijin League. He is the only player with just two losses, so if he can beat Han Zenki 7-dan in the final round he will become the challenger to Cho U Meijin. However, that may not be easy: Han Zenki has dramatically improved on his debut performance in the league last year, when he failed to win a game, and after the sixth round he briefly led the league (he was 4-2 to Takao's 3-2).

Ironically, if Han beats Takao, neither of them will make the play-off to decide the chal-



**31st Kisei A League** (1 June to October 2006)

| Place | Player/Opponent       | HN | MT | KH | YN | CU | HK | Score |
|-------|-----------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| 1     | Hane Naoki 9-dan      | —  | 1  |    |    | 1  |    | 2-0   |
| 2     | Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan | 0  | —  | 0  |    |    |    | 0-2   |
| 3     | Komatsu Hideki 9-dan  |    | 1  | —  | 1  |    |    | 2-0   |
| 4     | Yoda Norimoto Gosei   |    |    | 0  | —  |    | 1  | 1-1   |
| 5     | Cho U Meijin          | 0  |    |    |    | —  | 1  | 1-1   |
| 5     | Honda Kunihisa 9-dan  |    |    |    | 0  | 0  | —  | 0-2   |

**31st Kisei B League** (1 June to October 2006)

| Place | Player/Opponent        | YS | KS | KA | OR | CC | IT | Score |
|-------|------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| 1     | Yuki Satoshi 9-dan     | —  |    |    | 0  | 1  |    | 1-1   |
| 2     | Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan |    | —  | 0  |    | 1  |    | 1-1   |
| 3     | Kato Atsushi 8-dan     |    | 1  | —  |    |    | 1  | 2-0   |
| 4     | O Rissei 9-dan         | 1  |    |    | —  |    | 1  | 2-0   |
| 5     | Cho Chikun Judan       | 0  | 0  |    |    | —  |    | 0-2   |
| 5     | Imamura Toshiya 9-dan  |    |    |    | 0  |    | —  | 0-1   |

lenger, as they are both ranked too low. Instead, it will be contested by the winners of the games between Yamashita Keigo and Yoda Norimoto, on the one hand, and between Sakai Hideyuki and Yamada Kimio (all now on 4-3).

**Former Kiseis lead 31st Kisei Leagues**

With only five rounds, it's important to make a good start in the Kisei Leagues. Showing no after-effects from his Kisei dethronement, Hane Naoki has made a good start in the A League, while the early leader in the B League is O Rissei. They share these leads with Komatsu Hideki and Kato Atsushi, respectively. The other former Kisei in the current leagues, Cho Chikun, is already out of the running.

**Young Carp Tournament**

A new tournament has been founded for young players: the Hiroshima Aluminium Cup Young Carp Tournament. The sponsor is Hiroshima Aluminium Industries, and it is open to Nihon Ki-in players under 31 and under 6-dan. About 50 players will participate in the first term, the qualifying round of which started in July. They are competing for the 16 seats in the main tournament, which will be held in Hiroshima on 4 and 5 November.

The time allowance is 30 minutes, followed by byo-yomi of one minute per move. First prize is two million yen, second is 800,000 yen, and

there are two third prizes of 600,000 yen each.

The reason for giving the tournament the name of 'carp' is that there is a strong connection between carp and Hiroshima, though the exact reason is not known. Hiroshima Castle is nicknamed 'carp castle'; this is either from a pun on the name of the area in which the castle is located or comes from the fact that Hiroshima is one of the main centres of carp farming in Japan, especially coloured carp. The local baseball team is known as the Hiroshima Carp.

**Promotions**

To 9-dan: Imamura Yoshiaki (200 wins) (May)

To 7-dan: Tsujii Ryotaro (120 wins) (April), Ono Nobuyuki (May)

To 5-dan: Tsukuda Akiko (70 wins) (July)

To 4-dan: Ohashi Hirofumi (50 wins) (June)

**Retirement**

Kawamura Masamichi 7-dan (29 April).

**Obituaries****Morikawa Masao**


Morikawa Masao died of lung cancer on 23 May 2006. Born on 12 June 1919, he became a disciple of Maeda Nobuaki in 1935. He qualified as 1-dan in 1943 and reached 5-dan in 1978. He twice won the Oteai.



### Sekine Naohisa

Sekine Naohisa died on 3 July. Born on 2 November 1937, he was a disciple of Hoshino Toshi 9-dan. He became 1-dan in 1958 and reached 6-dan in 1983. He retired in 2000 and was promoted to 7-dan.

## News from Korea



*Cho Nam-ch'eol*

### Death of Cho Nam-ch'eol

Cho Nam-ch'eol, the founding father of professional go in Korea and its first outstanding player, died at his home in Seoul on 2 July at the age of 82. Cho played the main role in establishing go, which previously had been regarded as a gambling game in Korea, as a worthy profession.

Born on 30 November 1923, Cho went to Japan in 1937 to become a disciple of Kitani Minoru. In 1941, he qualified as a 1-dan at the Nihon Ki-in, becoming its first Korean member, then returned home in 1943. In 1945, he founded an organization, the Seoul Kiweon, that was a predecessor of the Korean Go Association (Hanguk Kiweon), which was founded in 1955. The first professional title, the Kuksu, was founded two years later, and Cho won it for the first nine years. He also won the second Korean title, the P'aewang (Conqueror) for its first four years, from 1959 to 1962. In all, he won a total of 30 titles.

Cho reached 9-dan in 1983. In 1984, he was awarded the Okura Prize by the Nihon Ki-in. He was active in promoting go exchange between Japan and Korea. He is the uncle of Cho Chikun

and Cho Shoen, who are members of the Nihon Ki-in.

### Yi defends Wangwi yet again

In the 40th Wangwi title match, Yi Ch'ang-ho decisively rebuffed the challenge of Yi Yeong-ku 5-dan (born on 23 August 1987). He won 3-0 and has now extended his record in this title to 11 successive terms.

First prize is 45 million won (the second highest for a domestic title) and second prize is six million won.

Game 1 (23 June). YCH (W) by 1½.

Game 2 (12 July). YCH (B) by resig.

Game 3 (19 July). YCH (W) by resig.

### Yi Ch'ang-ho wins 3rd Etland King of Kings

Yi Ch'ang-ho has won this title for the second year in a row. This year he defeated Pak Cheong-sang 5-dan 2-0 to take the 40-million-won first prize\*. Pak had to be content with 15 million won, but he was soon to improve on that amount by a factor of nearly ten in the Fujitsu Cup.



*A blast from the past: Seo Bong-su*

### Seo wins commemorative Kuksu tournament

This year the Kuksu tournament, Korea's oldest professional tournament, entered its 50th term, so an unofficial commemorative tournament was held in which all previous winners were invited to participate. Cho Nam-ch'eol, the very first winner, declined to participate for health reasons (he died soon after), but the other eight winners competed. Appropriately, the two players who made the final were Cho Hun-hyeon

\* Exchange rates as we go to press: \$1 = ¥115 = 955 won = 7.97 yuan = 32 Taiwanese dollars.



and Seo Bong-su, who dominated Korean go in the late 70s and 80s. They have played an astonishing total of 360 games, a figure unlikely ever to be rivalled by another pair. Including unofficial encounters, this was their 374th game.

Cho and Seo met in the Kuksu title match every year from 1981 to 1989. Cho won seven of those matches, but this time Seo took revenge; taking white, he secured a resignation.

### Korean rankings

As mentioned in *GW105* (page 10), the Korean Kiweon has introduced a ranking system. The rankings for the top 50 players are announced on the 1st of each month and cover the games played in the previous two years. Apparently, allowance is made for the importance of tournaments and the strength of opponents.

Not surprisingly, Yi Ch'ang-ho topped the first list and since then has been bumped down to second place only once. Below are the top ten from the list for May 2006 (it comes from the July issue of *Igo*).

1. Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan: 19,632
2. Yi Se-tol 9-dan: 18,570
3. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan: 18,520
4. Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan: 15,610
5. Cho Han-seung 8-dan: 14,659
6. An Cho-yeong 9-dan: 14,201
7. Pak Cheong-sang 5-dan: 13,758
8. Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan: 13,742
9. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan: 13,486
10. Weon Seong-chin 7-dan: 13,395

## News from China

### Gu Li wins 20th Tianyuan title

Yet another new young star has emerged in China, with the 15-year-old Zhou Ruiyang 3-dan becoming the challenger for the 20th Tianyuan title. He lost the match 0-3 to Gu Li 9-dan, but his success in reaching a final, following on that of Chen Yaoye, who took second place in the 10th LG Cup, shows that China is doing something right in training its youngsters. The youthful Korean stars may be looking apprehensively over their shoulders.

To celebrate the 20th anniversary, first prize was raised from 50,000 yuan to 200,000 and second from 15,000 to 50,000.

### Play-off to decide the challenger

(19 February). Zhou (B) defeated Kong Jie by resig.  
Game 1 (21 May). Gu (W) by resig.  
Game 2 (30 May). Gu (B) by resig.  
Game 3 (31 May). Gu (B) by 3½.

### Luo Xihe wins CCTV Cup

Luo Xihe 9-dan, current holder of the LG Cup, defeated Wang Xi 5-dan in the final of the 19th CCTV Cup, held on 6 July. Playing black, he won by 1½ points. Luo is known as a super-fast player, but surprisingly this is his first win in this fast-go title. Both players will represent China in the TV Asia Cup.

First prize is 80,000 yuan and second 30,000.

### Wang Xi wins Ricoh Cup

The final of the 6th Ricoh Cup was held in Nanjing City on 2 April. Wang Xi 5-dan (W) beat Chang Hao 9-dan by resignation. Wang also won this Japanese-sponsored tournament last year. First prize is 100,000 yuan, second 50,000.

### Awards to Fujisawa Shuko and Miyamoto Naoki

On 4 June, the day after the Fujitsu Cup quarterfinals, a ceremony was held at the Chinese Ki-in at which awards for contributions to Japan-China exchange were made to Fujisawa Shuko, Hon. Kisei, Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan, and Narita Masaru, formerly of the Fujitsu Corporation. Starting in 1981, Shuko led groups of young professionals on tours of China 13 times and has made many other contributions to exchange between the two countries. Miyamoto Naoki has also made many contributions and is said to have visited China more than 100 times. Narita Masaru played a major role in creating the Fujitsu Cup.

After the ceremony, Shuko also played a game with Nie Weiping, but, unfortunately, it finished early because of a Shuko oversight; he then conducted a study session with Chinese professionals.

### Ratings update

Below is the latest ratings list to hand. It was probably issued at the end of spring (our source is the August 2006 issue of *Igo*). Note that although Zhou Ruiyang makes the top ten, LG Cup finalist Chen Yaoye doesn't.

- |                      |                       |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Gu Li: 2728       | 6. Hu Yaoyu: 2635     |
| 2. Zhou Heyang: 2690 | 7. Zhou Ruiyang: 2626 |
| 3. Xie He: 2663      | 8. Chang Hao: 2624    |



4. Kong Jie: 2660  
5. Wang Xi: 2643

9. Luo Xihe: 2620  
10. Wang Lei (8-dan):  
2611

Game 1 (23 May). Lin (B) by 6½.  
Game 2 (30 May). Zhou (B) by 3½.  
Game 3 (6 June). Zhou (W) by resig.  
Game 4 (13 June). Zhou (B) by 4½.

## News from Taiwan

### 1st Wangzuo Title

This is a new title, founded on 1 June 2005 as a successor to the Taiwan Ki-in Cup. The name means 'throne' and is written with the same characters as the Japanese Oza title. The finalist in the first best-of-five title match were Zhou Junxun 9-dan and Lin Zhihan 7-dan, with the former prevailing by a 3–1 margin.

## Corrections

### Go World 107

The cover called this the winter issue, but the contents page, calling it the spring issue, was correct.

(page 3) The Fujitsu Cup was the 19th, not the 18th.

(page 10) Wang Lei was mistakenly called Wang Wei (three times).

## New book: *Go Basics*

*Go Basics* introduces a new way to learn to play go. Designed by well-known go writer Peter Shotwell, author of critically acclaimed *Go! More Than a Game*, it is the first book to concentrate solely on 9x9 games. Without the distractions that larger boards create, this unique approach can quickly bring younger kids into the game with the guidance of parents, while older ones can learn from it on their own. Time-harried adults will also enjoy it, because they will quickly and painlessly be able to understand the principles of go, no matter what the size of the board.

This is because the first half is a game played by two Japanese professionals that takes readers from the opening moves to the endgame, while covering all the basic moves and strategies. The second half consists of six more professional games, which spectacularly illustrate advanced concepts, such as large and small sacrifices, invasions, how to play *ko*, and how to think territorially. It is hard to believe that what takes place in these games is on small boards, so the book will also appeal to experienced players, who like the quickness and excitement of 9x9 go.

Another big bonus is that this is the first book to include the American Go Association CD-ROM. Its hundreds of features include how to find other players on and off the Internet, more teaching games, and many articles about the world of professional and amateur go, and the game's influence in Eastern and Western history, science, literature and art. It also has *Igowin*, an intelligent, interactive 9x9 game, so readers can begin playing immediately. Even more, by following sample games against it in the last chapter of *Go Basics*, they can quickly and effortlessly bring their handicaps down to 0 and begin playing 'real' go.

Available from Tuttle Publishing at [www.Tuttlepublishing.com](http://www.Tuttlepublishing.com), by phone at 1-800-526-2778 in the USA, and in bookstores and on the Internet throughout the world.



# Japan Breaks the Korean Monopoly

## Yoda's Triumph in the Nong Shim Cup

*Commentary by Takao Shinji. Report by Akiyama Kenji.*

On 24 February, all Japan was elated by the news of Arakawa Shizuka's gold medal [Japan's only medal] in the women's figure skating at the Turin Olympics. But on the same day there was even better news for Japanese go fans. Yoda Norimoto had won three games in the final round of the 7th Nong Shim Cup and secured Japan's first 'gold medal' in this team event. The Nong Shim Cup had been a Korean monopoly; in particular, Yi Ch'ang-ho had won 14 games in a row during the first six terms. Overcoming his opposition enhanced the value of Yoda's triumph. We asked Takao Shinji Honinbo, who, with Mimura Tomoyasu and Ryu Shikun, handled the Nihon Ki-in's live Net coverage of the tournament, to review Yoda's games [all comments in quotes are by him].

Takao: "Magnificent" is the only word for Yoda's feat. My respect for him has grown. I was so slack I couldn't score even one win, so I increased the burden on him . . . The only amends I can make is to review [the final game] to the best of my ability.

Before looking at the Yi game in detail, we present brief commentaries by Takao on Yoda's first two games.

### Game 12: Yoda vs. Cho Han-seung

About 100 reporters gathered for the press conference before this game. Yoda: 'I'm happy to be able to compete in an arena like this — because so many go fans are following the games. I will just play my hardest.'

His opponent, Cho Han-seung, had the momentum of three successive wins; the day before, he had scored an upset win against Chang Hao.

Takao: 'I've lost to Cho, too — though it was a game I should have won.'

**White:** Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan)

**Black:** Cho Han-seung 8-dan (Korea)

Komi: 6½; time: 1 hour plus 1 minute per move

Played in Shanghai on 22 February 2006.

**Figure 1 (1–50).** *Aggressive play by Yoda*

Full of fighting spirit, Yoda starts a ko fight

with 40, but actually cutting at A would be a better way to fight the ko.

'The trade from the ko is even. I think that moving out with B would have been better than 50.'




Figure 1 (1–50)

36: ko (at 30); 41: ko (at 23)




Figure 2 (51–100)

95: connects

**Figure 2 (51–100).** *Cho's erratic play*

'Black 65. Black A might be better.'




‘Black 73, 75. Is this capture really big? Playing 73 at 74 looks thicker.’


‘White 86. I would stabilize the corner group with White A.’

Pushing down with Black 87 is very forceful. The game seems a little tough for Yoda at this point.

‘Black 93 is strange. If Black cut with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, the game would be good for him. The connection of 95 is unbelievable. There’s a limit to how much territory Black can seize here. Cho seems to be too preoccupied with the wrong area.’



*Dia. 1: Black is ahead*




*Figure 3 (101–155)*

**Figure 3 (101–155). A touch ahead**

When White connects at 4, the game is starting to feel like an upset. Once he becomes confident he is a little ahead, Yoda plays flawlessly. Cho is known for his endgame skill, but he is given no chance to get back into the game.

**Figure 4 (156–210). Yoda’s faultless endgame**  
*Black resigns after White 210.*





‘The only thing is that I don’t feel White has the lead after 55 [Figure 2]. Perhaps White should have played 40 at A. Instead of 44, a hane at White B seems to be a more effective strategy.’




Figure 2 (51-100)  
78: ko (at 68)

### Figure 2 (51-100). Kong’s fighting spirit

Yoda again settles his group skilfully in the fight started by Black 59. Takao: ‘White 60 is powerful. Playing at 85 is the only move that occurred to me. Black is full of fighting spirit with 67, but pushing up at 85 instead is probably par for the course. Black 81 is a move of unbridled aggression, but it’s clearly unreasonable. Our conclusion was that the game would have been virtually over if White had cut at 83 instead of 82.’

### Figure 3 (101-150). Courting danger

‘White 12 is a good move. White does well to find it in byo-yomi. When White cuts at 26, it looks as if he can win by a little, but after this both sides are plunged into massive confusion.’

White 30. White 33 would be simpler.

White 46 could easily have become the losing move. Playing the diagonal move of White 49 would be better; if Black wants to take away his eye shape, he has to play at 50, but White plays at 46, and he wins the capturing race with the group on the right side by one move. Having missed this move, White’s position should collapse. Namely —




Figure 3 (101-150)





Figure 4 (151-200)  
78: ko (below 75); 80: connects (at 75)



Dia. 1: White collapses



**Figure 4 (151–200). A joint oversight**

Instead of 53, Black could hane in at 1 in *Dia. 1*. If White 2, Black gets a ladder with 3 etc. If White plays 2 at 4, Black counters at 5 and wins the fight. Both sides overlooked this diagram.

Both players had assumed that 53 to 58 was the only sequence. At any rate, Yoda was skating on thin ice. The confusion continues.

‘White 62. If at A, Black can’t live — the game would have been over. Playing White 72 at 73 would also secure a win.’




Figure 5 (201–236)

14: ko (at 2); 17: ko (at 11); 20: ko (at 2);  
27: connects (below 23); 32: ko (at 28)

**Figure 5 (201–236). The final mistake**

‘White 22. White A would have secured a definite lead.

‘Black 23 may be the losing move. If Black had blocked at B, it would have been a half-pointer that either side might have won.’

The confused fight ends with White 36.  
Black resigns after White 236.

**Game 14: Yoda vs. Yi Ch’ang-ho**

White: Yi Ch’ang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Yoda Norimoto

Played in Shanghai on 24 February 2006.

**Figure 1 (1–46) A tricky fight starts.**

White 8 starts a skirmish.

‘When Black drew back with 13, I thought that this variation was good for him, but appar-

ently Yi considers it playable for White. Instead of 23, I would set up a ladder with 26. I don’t understand White 28 and 30 very well, but I admire these moves.’




Figure 1 (1–46)

19: ko

Presumably White’s strategy is to store up strength up to 38 so that he can fight when Black pulls out his stone with 39.

‘The peep of White 42 sparks off an incident. Taking a firm grip on the two black stones with White A instead might have been good enough.

‘Yoda takes the plunge with 43. I wrote in the Net commentary that I would have gratefully connected at 44, but Black 43 is best — if it works.’

Neither side can back away from the fight. Hostilities open with the cut of 44 and 46. ‘I can’t read the capturing race, so I couldn’t embark on such a frightening fight.’



Yi: previously undefeated in the Nong Shim Cup







Figure 2 (47-100)

79: ko (at 59); 80: connects (at 65)



Dia. 1: a difficult fight

12: connects (above 4)


### Figure 2 (47-100). An uncharacteristic error

Takao, Mimura and Ryu were going full-pelt putting up reference diagrams for the Net commentary, but no one foresaw Black 47.

'This move startled me. We were just arriving at the conclusion that Black gets a good result by pushing through at 49. However, things were not as simple as we thought. After Black cuts at 5 in *Dia. 1*, White 6 is a formidable counter. After 7 and 8, connecting with Black 10 is uninteresting, as White moves out with 9. Black pulls himself together and forces with 9 and 11 before extricating himself with 13 to 17, but I don't know what to do if White cuts at 'a'. It's difficult to know if Black should fight with 'b' or compromise with 'c'. Probably all you can say is that it would be an even fight. Black should have chosen this course. It's clear that Black 47 in the game is a bad move.'

Actually, at this point Yoda was running the risk of collapse, but neither player was aware of this.

The moves to 55 are a one-way street. White 56 is Yi's biggest missed opportunity of the game.



Dia. 2: Yi's missed opportunity

'White could have played 1 in *Dia. 2*. Even if Black tries to set up a capturing race with 2 to 4, White's all-out move of 1 proves useful, and White can't be captured after 5 etc. Even if Black changes course, switching 4 here to 5, like 9 in *Dia. 1*, the centre has already been decided, so this time he can't safely extricate his group. Yoda was walking on thin ice.'

Yi Ch'ang-ho is only human, after all. Having played 56, he has to give way with 62 when Black extends at 61, so Black wins the capturing race with 63 on. Yoda read it out properly and delivered the finishing blow with 89.

The question is where does this leave the territorial balance. The three players doing the Net commentary declared that the game was over and started talking about a celebratory drink. However, some players on the spot claimed that White was ahead.

Yoda: 'The position is probably not bad for Black. But he's not that far ahead in territory. I thought that it was still a very tough game.'

Takao: 'We got carried away — it was just Yoda Sensei who was assessing the position accurately. It's certainly true that Black can't be optimistic.'

Black 93 shows that Black was concerned to avoid a *semedori* (being forced to add stones to remove the captured group from the board), but a white move at 93 would not be sente, so it's not so big. Occupying the large point of A at the bottom had top priority.

When White expands his moyo with 94 to 100, Black really can't be optimistic.





Figure 3 (101-140)



Dia. 3: the game is up for grabs

### Figure 3 (101-140). Mistakes by both sides

'Black 5 could have been a hane at 6. If I were playing, I would attach at A instead of 7; if White B, Black defiantly takes up position at C. It's worrying when Black lets White get a big bottom area, as in the game.'

Black 9 and 11 look like signs of the optimism Yoda is known for. But apparently the players on the spot labeled White 14 as slack the moment Yi played it.

'I agree. What if White had pushed up with 1 in Dia. 3? If Black 2, White cuts at 3; if Black 4 to 8, White extends at 9. There's no knowing what will happen now.'


Both sides make a number of dubious moves after this. With the short time limits, that can't be helped.

'Black probably could have been more greedy with 15, playing a line higher at D. Instead of 20, the sequence in Dia. 4 would be more disagreeable.'

'Black 29 is very dubious. If Black had first exchanged E for White F, then played at 29, he would have had a small but secure win. Pulling back at 35 would be slightly superior to Black

33.'

The goddess of victory seemed to have deserted Yoda when he missed the chance to play at E. However, the issue was decided in surprising fashion.



Dia. 4: better for 20




Figure 4 (141-173)

72: connects

### Figure 4 (141-173). Yi's overplay

Resorting to sheer force in trying to take the centre with 46 is the losing move.

'If White had connected at A, there would have been no win for Yoda. Black can tenuki, but White can squeeze all the way, beginning with B, making the game clearly a loss for Black.'

If White 46 and 50 secure all the centre, White will win regardless of A, but that's expecting too much. White's centre position is destroyed and the game comes to an abrupt conclusion. After 73, B and C are miai.

[Go Weekly had run out of space, so it didn't treat the last stage of the game in detail, but a




commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan in *Monthly Go World* elucidates some interesting points in the fight.


Firstly, White can't play 60 at 1 in *Dia. 5*. After 2 and 4, Black has the *atekomi* of 6. White collapses after 16.

One may wonder why Black doesn't play 63 at 1 in *Dia. 6*, as this seems to cut off the white stones on the side, but things are different from *Dia. 5*. White counters with 2 and 4, and, if Black denies him eye space on the side, is able to pull out his stones up to 10.


Playing 68 at 70, that is, at 1 in *Dia. 7*, doesn't help White. After 2 and 3, White has no answer to Black 4. Black 'a' will be sente, so White can't atari above 4; if White 'b', Black 'c'.]



*Dia. 5: White dies*



*Dia. 6: Black fails*



*Dia. 7: White has no answer*

Black crossed a few dangerous bridges, but in international tournaments the result is everything. We can only express our gratitude to Yoda.

*White resigns after Black 173.*

(*Go Weekly*, 13 March 2006, and *Monthly Go World*, April 2006. Translated by John Power.)



*Yoda finally breaks the Korean monopoly.*

# The 30th Kisei Title Match: Games Three and Four

We presented the first two games of this title match in our previous issue. Honours had been more or less evenly divided in those games, with Hane doing well in the first and Yamashita dominating the second. The only thing was that Yamashita had won both games. Dropping a game in which you have played well is very costly; however, the second half of the title match followed the same pattern.



*Everything was working out right for Yamashita in his bid to reclaim the Kisei title.*

## Game Three: An endgame contest

**White:** Hane Naoki Kisei

**Black:** Yamashita Keigo 9-dan

Komi: 6½; time: 8 hours each

Played at the Hotel Mare Takata, Maizuru City, Kyoto Prefecture on 8 & 9 February 2006.


*Commentary by Yuki Satoshi 9-dan. Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.*

**Figure 1 (1–42).** *Yamashita prefers to fight rather than to make bad shape.*


The low checking extension of 6 is a recent innovation; settling himself here is easy for White when he attaches at 8. Black hanes on the outside at 9, and White settles himself in the corner with 10 and 12. In response, Black expands his moyo with 13 and 15.

[By coincidence, an article by Kobayashi Koichi analysing the continuations after White 6 was published in *Go Weekly* the Sunday before this game. There was some speculation as to whether

the players had seen it, but in any case the game quickly developed beyond the scope of the article. For readers interested, a translation is presented later in this issue (page 62).]



*Figure 1 (1–42)*



*Dia. 1: bad shape  
3: elsewhere*

White 16. If White A, Yamashita planned to press at 32. Perhaps sensing this, Hane immediately set his stone in motion with the shoulder hit of 16.

White 20 is a solid move. Simply jumping to 38 would be the usual move, but White is aiming at the wedge of 22. If Black plays 21 at 1 in *Dia. 1*, forcing White 2, he can forestall the wedge, but later he will get bad shape when White peeps at 4. Out of dislike for this, Black simply jumps to 21; he is prepared to fight when White makes the wedge. However, Yamashita's judgement here was not necessarily correct.

Pushing up with Black 35 and 39 after cutting at 33 is a powerful way of playing. However,



White always keeps one step ahead of Black, so the latter can't balance his books unless he gets considerable compensation.





Figure 2 (43-81)

**Figure 2 (43-81).** *Hane takes the lead.*

Yamashita expected White to play 44 at 48. In that case, Black could rap White on the head at 44 and get good shape in the top right.

However, Hane kept extending at 44. Yamashita had thought that in that case pressing at Black 48 instead of 47 would put White on the spot. He read and read to check if he was right, then sealed the next move. In the end, he came to the conclusion that pressing at 48 was unreasonable, so he didn't go through with it. Yuki revealed what must have been the content of his reading.




*Dia. 2: good for White*

*Dia. 2.* If Black presses at 1, White moves out with 2 and 4, then cuts at 6. Extending at 7 is forced. If Black blocks 8 with 9, the sequence to 18 follows; Black can't resist any further — if he does, something will be captured. He has no choice but to defend at 19, so White gets a ponnuki and a good result with 20. [The proverb claims that a ponnuki is worth 30 points, but here Black's capture is worth closer to 40, which shows how highly Yuki evaluates this ponnuki.] Instead of 14 —

*Dia. 3.* Pushing through and cutting with 1 and 3 is also feasible; in this variation, White's large group comes back to life up to 13.

Either way, there are no good variations for Black. Yamashita altered his original schedule and chose the one-space jump of 47 for his sealed move. White had done well on the opening day.




*Dia. 3: good for White*

In the fighting from the centre to the left side, Black presses with 51 and 57 and splits White into two, but White gets good shape with 58 and 60. This result was considered favourable for White; in the pressroom, according to Yuki, 'people were saying that the game was already a win for White. That's how big the gap actually was.' When White switches to 66, he certainly has a lead.


Black tries to salvage something of his centre right-side position with 67, but the game remains tough for him.

When Black makes the probe of 73, White, confident he is ahead, answers submissively at 74. Dodging to 75 is clever; Black scores points by playing the well-timed atekomi of 79 and crawling at 81. Instead of 74 —



*Dia. 4: a big improvement for White*

*Dia. 4.* Pushing through and cutting with 1 and 3 would be better. Yamashita knew that this counterattack was possible, but said that he had no counter. If the sequence to 11 followed, Black would be in trouble, so he might play 4 at 5, then attach at 'a', but that would be a big difference from the game.



*Figure 3 (82-106)*

**Figure 3 (82-106).** *Hane falters.*


White 82. White would like to extend at A, but something like Black B would give him a bad result. Making do with the peep at 82 before switching to the bottom left with 84 is natural.

However, connecting with White 86 is inexplicable. Black 87 is sente, so Black continues with 89, snuffing out the life of these stones. In-


stead of 86 —

*Dia. 5.* White could have got a ko with 1 and 3. Abandoning this variation is painful.

In effect, White has suffered two setbacks recently (74 in Figure 2 and 86 here), so the lead has been thrown into confusion. The game will be decided by how much territory White gets at the top.



*Dia. 5: ko  
(ko captures omitted)*



*Dia. 6: better for 92*

White 92 is dubious. At a commentary given at the hotel where the game was being played, the audience was asked to guess the next move after 91. Only one person chose 92. The most popular move was the knight's move of 1 in *Dia. 6*. This is actually a good move; if Black invades at 2, White plays 7 etc. in sente, which is too good for him. Therefore, Black will jump to 7 instead of 2, so White could then defend at 3; the issue would still be undecided.

Black seizes the initiative when he moves out comfortably with 93. In view of the later development, a large-knight's move at 98 would be superior to 94, in that it would not give the opponent any momentum. Invading at 99 after forcing with 95 is severe. Being split into two would be painful for White, so using 100 as a sacrifice to link up is natural, but . . .

Getting a ponnuki with 105 is perfect for Black. According to Yuki, there are no good variations for White after this, so the fight here seems to have been decisive.







Figure 4 (107-150)  
34: connects



Dia. 7: good for Black

**Figure 4 (107-150). Yamashita's flawless endgame**


White 10. Hane has made a miscalculation: he thought that this would make things tough for Black, but the latter is able to switch elsewhere after adding just one stone at 11. Black secures the key point of 13. Instead of 10 —

*Dia. 7.* The players on the spot thought that extending at 1 was the only move, but 'that's not necessarily correct,' according to Yuki. It's certainly true that 1 is a big move, but Black will lay waste to the top with 4 etc., so White doesn't get a good result. The game was already tough for White.

Black forces with 35, then takes the large reverse-sente endgame point of 37.

From this point on, Yamashita's endgame is flawless. Various points were questioned in the pressroom during the game, but, according to Yuki's later research, Yamashita played the best moves. Not only was his reading impressive, he also chose the right course at each turning point, which shows that his refined competitive instincts were operating at a brilliant pitch.

Playing 43 and 45, then making eyes with 47 and 49 is correct. White would really like to play 48 at 1 in *Dia. 8*, but Black will let fly with the attachment of 2. Resisting with 3 is unreasonable: White collapses after 4 to 8.



Dia. 8: unreasonable




Figure 5 (151-200)  
ko: 81, 84, 87, 90, 93


**Figure 5 (151-200). A delicate endgame**

Capturing with 55 was considered dubious during the game by the players in the pressroom — because the cut of White 58 is big. However, if Black uses 55 to connect at 58, a ko follows with White A—Black 55—White B, but Black doesn't have enough ko threats. The only compensation he can take is small, so he won't profit even if he makes two free moves. The conclusion is that 55 is correct.

The game is close, but Yamashita hangs on to a small lead; he is moving steadily towards victory. Hane can't win if the game proceeds normally: he has to do something.

White could have offered some resistance by

using 72 to set up the ko shown in *Dia. 9*. According to Yuki's research, White falls just one ko threat short, but it's a different question whether the players would have been able to find the best moves in byo-yomi, so it might have been worth trying this diagram. The only thing is that Hane had apparently not noticed the ko threats in the bottom left corner.




*Dia. 9 (1-34)*

ko: 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34

Yamashita started a ko fight with 77. Yuki believed, as presumably did Yamashita, that if Black didn't fight the ko he would lose by half a point, but actually that was not the case. Rin Kaiho's study group examined the position and concluded that Black would win by half a point if he played the sente move of 79, then connected at C.


Black has started a risky ko, but when White plays 82 he doesn't have enough ko threats. Hane hadn't noticed the ko threats in the bottom left corner, so that can't be helped, but he could have fought more tenaciously by using 82 to follow *Dia. 10*. Black has to play with extreme caution; the key point is whether or not he discovers the good move of the attachment at 26 at the top; if Black captures at 28, he launches on a winning line. However, if he links up immediately with 32 on the top right side, as here, White connects at 33 and wins by half a point. Instead of 32 —

*Dia. 11*. Black must capture at 1. The conclusion is that Black can win by half a point, but only if he discovers the good move of 7, ramming into White.



*Dia. 10 (1-65)*

ko (over 3): 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24



*Dia. 11 (1-55)*

ko (over 14): 22, 25, 28; 34: connects (at 19)

The above diagrams show the best endgame, according to Yuki's research. He was able to find a variation in which Black ended up with a win. However, there's no guarantee Black would have been able to find the best sequence while immersed in an ultra-difficult ko fight. In short, Yamashita crossed a dangerous bridge.

*Black wins by 1½ points.*

(*Monthly Go World*, April 2006)

In the interview after this game, Yamashita commented: 'If I lose even one game, the flow of the series will change. I want to decide the series at one stroke.'






Figure 6 (201-242)  
26: ko (above 23); 32: connects (at 23);  
42: connects (right of 8)

## Game Four: Yamashita's comeback

White: Yamashita Keigo

Black: Hane Naoki

Played in Kumamoto City on 22 & 23 February 2006. Commentary by Yamashita Keigo Kisei. Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.





Figure 1 (1-28)

Figure 1 (1-28). Every move a turning point

The fighting 3-4 point of 3 is one of Hane's favourite patterns. There are many examples of it. He has also played the continuation of Black

11 etc. after White 8 and 10 a number of times, but, rude though it is of me to say so, I don't remember it working out very well. The fact that he played it again in this game had to mean that he had made an improvement on the pattern at some point. I was looking forward to seeing it.



Dia. 1: an alternative strategy for 16

Hane has played 15 at A; in that game, White played 16 and Black immediately set his stone in motion with 21, but again the result wasn't very promising. Perhaps that's why he switched to the corner enclosure of 15 this time.


White 16 looks natural — the top right corner and the bottom left corner were more or less miai.

The only thing is that during the game, since my opponent didn't make the turning move of A, I did also consider pressing at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black will probably slide to 2; once he has played here, one no longer feels inclined to make an approach move at 'a'. If one were to play an approach move, it would probably be the high one at 'b'. I thought that White could play 3 at the top and make a game of it. This looks like an even game. But I had a feeling that this was what Hane wanted, which is why I chose the approach move in the game.

When White plays 16, Black 17 is one of the moves he has taken into account. However dodging to 19 is unusual. I knew that I had seen this move somewhere, but it was the first time I had had it played against me.

Rin Kaiho, Honorary Tengen, who was the referee for this game, said that he had played it some 30 years earlier. Could Black 19 have been


the improvement to this pattern that, as mentioned above, I had been expecting Hane to play?




*Dia. 2: White is satisfied*

If, instead of 19, Black played at 1 in *Dia. 2*, I planned to press at 2. The moves to 7 follow and are more or less considered a joseki. However, in this shape White can play two forcing moves at 'a' and 'b'. I consider the result a little painful for Black locally.

White's conceivable answers to 19 are capturing at 21, ramming into Black with 24, the pincer played in the game, etc. If White captures at 21, Black will probably play at B. I decided against this, as it felt a little insipid and seemed to be what the opponent wanted.



*Dia. 3: submissive*




*Dia. 4: satisfactory*

I didn't feel like ramming into Black with 1 in *Dia. 3*. If Black had played 17 at 1 in *Dia. 4*, White 2 would be a splendid move; if Black 3, White 4. However, the exchange of the marked stones in *Dia. 3* is terribly submissive. If Black played at 'a' in *Dia. 4*, White would of course block at 'b', but it's as if he's answered at 'c'.


The sequence from Black 21 gives a safe result. However, both sides could have played differently. Each move could perhaps be called a turning point.

White 22. I also considered 1 and 'a' in *Dia. 5*. White 1 needs an extra move at 'b' to complete the blockade. White 'a' seals Black in with one move, but it's a little thin. Each move has an advantage and a drawback. Instead of this unyielding variation, I just linked up with 22, which I thought was good enough for White.




*Dia. 5: uncompromising*

Hane simply made a hane at 23, but he could first have played at 1 in *Dia. 6*. White will answer with 4 and 6. In this shape, Black has the sente cut of 8, so he can make a placement at 7. White has to answer at 8, so Black gets not inconsiderable corner profit with 9. The difference from the game is that White is left with the option of pulling out the marked stones. Big though it is, hastening to take the corner profit would be dubious; I think that the move played in the game is correct. Instead of 8 —



*Dia. 6: corner profit*



*Dia. 7: White collapses*

*Dia. 7.* If White intercepts with 8, he collapses.


Black's position to 27 is superior to his position in *Dia. 2*. Why, then, did I content myself with the sequence from 22? The reason was as follows.

Even in a game in which the black enclosing move (15) in the top right corner and the white approach move at 16 had not been played, if the variation in the top left appeared, I would make an approach move at 1 in *Dia. 8* (next page). Black will, of course, counter with the pincer of 2. However, in the game, this pincer has been switched to 'a' in the top right. *Dia. 2* is good for




White; the variation to 27 in the game is perhaps equal. White gets to make a second move in the bottom left with 28. That's why I chose 22. If 15 and 16 had not been played, I might have followed *Dia. 5* instead of 22.

When I linked up with 22 and got to play 28, I felt that White had a small lead.



*Dia. 8: basis for comparison*




*Figure 2 (29-58)*

### Figure 2 (29-58). Hane's dubious strategy


The location of Black 49 looks correct. If Black plays the high move of 50, White will slide under him with A. If he plays 49 at 51, he gives White the shoulder hit of 50; if he holds back at B, White will extend to 51.

Black 51 was queried by the players on the spot. It surprised me, too, and I was grateful for the continuation to 56.

Black should have played 51 at 1 in *Dia. 9*. If White cuts at 2, Black counters with 3 and 5. White could resist with 6 and 8, nullifying the ladder of Black 12, but the result to 15 is not appealing for White. The reason is that, after White 'a', Black can stir up trouble with 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd'.




*Dia. 9: better for 51*



*Dia. 10: still better than 51*

I planned to switch 6 in *Dia. 9* to 1 in *Dia. 10*. White squeezes up to 8, then switches to 9. Hane apparently disliked the prospect of White 9, and I also thought it gave White a reasonable position, but the submissive move of 55 in the game is painful. It may not be feasible at this point, but White can aim at the severe attachment of C. In contrast, the profit Black takes from capturing the two stones in *Dia. 10* is quite big. Even if White does get to play at 9, Black can force with 'a' through White 'd', then occupy the large point of 'e' on the top right side. This may not give Black the lead, but I think it's superior to what he played in the game.


Note that Black can't resist with 55 at 1 in *Dia. 11*. When White cuts at 2, Black continues with 3 and 5, but the addition of the stone at 4 makes White 'a' a more powerful threat. Not to mention the fact that —



*Dia. 11: not good Dia. 12: Black in trouble*

*Dia. 12.* White can play the standard tesuji of 1 etc. Besides the aji of 'a', he also has the aji of 'b'—Black 'c'—White 'd'. This will be too much for Black to handle.

Black gets to make the extension to 57 he was aiming at, but White is quite satisfied when he switches to 58 (the sealed move).




*Figure 3 (59–89)*

### Figure 3 (59–89). Helped out by Takao

Black 59. Hane must have felt he was behind. Compared to the 'usual' answer of Black 65, this could perhaps be called a do-or-die move. However, I felt that I profited in the continuation to 80. White can aim at the wedges at A and B; that's why Black plays 77 and 79, but the ex-

change of the latter for White 80 is particularly painful:


We looked at a number of variations after the game, trying to work out where Black went wrong, but we didn't reach a conclusion. It was not until I came back to Tokyo and looked at *Go Weekly* that the problem was solved. I am indebted to the insight of Takao [Honinbo], who maintained that Black should have played 77 at 1 in *Dia. 13*. White has no choice but to play 2 and 4, so 5 and 7 become sente. Black 'a' is also likely to be sente. Black could then perhaps play 9, getting a big improvement on the game.



*Dia. 13: Takao's theory*

Black 81 is not small, but it is dubious. White 82 etc. serve to block off the centre, as White has the sente peep of C. On top of that, White keeps sente up to 89. Black should have been more patient, playing 81 at 83, like 9 in *Dia. 13*.

Well, was it possible for Black to resist White 82? Instead of 83 —



*Dia. 14: looking ominous for Black*

*Dia. 14.* Black would like to extend at 1. However, getting an ally in place (the marked stone) means that White might be able to attach at 4. White 2 is a preparatory move — if necessary, White can also force with 'a' or 'b'. In answer to 7, White gives way with 8, then blocks with 10. I hadn't thought about this deeply — if



Black had extended at 1, I planned to analyse it thoroughly — but it's probably not advisable for Black.

Incidentally, if Black had played 81 at 83, I planned to play at D.

Note that Black 89 defends against the threat of White E.





Figure 4 (90-121)



Dia. 15: alternative for 92

**Figure 4 (90-121). Black misses his chance.**


When I reduced Black's moyo from above with 90, I firmly believed I had the lead. Instead of 92, I also considered playing 1 and 3 in *Dia. 15*, but I thought that 92 was more solid. However, White 100 was a mistake: I should have exchanged 120 for Black 121. With that exchange in place, White could have answered 103 with an atari at 108.

I was quite upset by my failure to make this hane. This kind of shock has a lingering effect. White 110 was a miscalculation: it was my second mistake.


Instead of 110, White 1 in *Dia. 16* is the commonsense move. This would secure quite a big lead for White. However, if you hypothesize the continuation from Black 2 to 8, having the White 'a'–Black 'b' exchange on the board would be a gain. After the sequence to 8, Black will, of

will, of course, answer 'a' with 'c'. That's why I played 110 in the figure.

Since Black is behind, you can't expect him to docilely answer White 110. The hane of 111 was a big shock for White.



Dia. 16: a win for White



Dia. 17: Black's chance

However, Black missed his chance with 115. He could have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 17*; if White 4, Black captures the three centre stones with 5 and 7. If Black had played this way, I might have panicked.

White 112 and 114 are equivalent to filling in *dame* points. At the time, I wondered what I was doing, but I was relieved when I calmly counted the score to find that I was still ahead.

**Figure 5 (122-160). Ko not needed**

What with my successive mistakes, it wouldn't have been surprising if I had lost my cool (actually I had quite a bit), but luckily I was able to regain my composure. I had squandered much of my lead, but I was able to confirm that I had still kept a slight lead.

I might have let my feelings get the better of me with 30 and 32, however. Turning at 1 in *Dia. 18* was actually worth more. The only thing

is that White 3 is the most reasonable answer to Black 2, so later, when White plays 5 and 7, Black won't answer at 'a' but at 8. That's why I played 30 and 32 at this stage.







Figure 5 (122-160)



Dia. 18: better for 30  
4: elsewhere



Dia. 19: a needless worry



Dia. 20: the ko is too much trouble

Actually, I was afraid that Black wouldn't answer docilely, and, sure enough, he countered with 33 and the 37-39 combination. He was challenging me to fight a ko in the corner. Considering Black was behind, this attitude was only natural.

Incidentally, before playing 33, Black would like to play 34 — if White answers at A, this result is superior. Hane said that he disliked the prospect of White's turning at 2 in *Dia. 19*. If Black 3 and 5, White links up with 6. I was, of course, planning to answer Black 34 at A.

White 42. If White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 20*, he gets a ko; after recapturing the ko, Black gets a direct ko with 'a' and White 1. But Black won't start the ko fight immediately with 'a'; he will play at other points, such as 'b'. Even so, White can't finish off the bottom right corner ko with one move. Furthermore, Black 'b' eliminates the ko threats White has with 42 etc. in the figure. I thought that I would have had the edge in a ko fight, but that not starting the ko kept the game simpler. I adopted a safety-first policy.



Nothing went right for Hane in this series.





The players confirm the win for Yamashita.




Figure 6 (161–200)

**Figure 6 (161–200).** *Calculations made*

Black secured life for the corner group with 51 in Figure 5, but White can still get a seki with White 73–Black A–White B. To turn this corner into territory, Black has to add another move, which he does later with 73. In other words, White can play two moves elsewhere if he lets Black get territory in the corner; I thought that this kept the game simple. Of course, I had counted.




Figure 7 (201–243)

**Figure 7 (201–243).** *Kisei again*

After Black 3, Black could get a ko if he threw in at 14, but he wouldn't win it. That's why I linked up with 2. I played at 14 soon after only because we had run out of places to play.

The lead White took in the opening of this game seems to have been bigger than I had realized. In particular, the sequence from 50 in Figure 2 was even more than I had hoped for. I was lucky that none of the mistakes I made was fatal,

but one should play more soundly in winning a won game.

Having made a comeback as Kisei, I feel the heaviness of the responsibility of my position. There were many aspects of my play in the series that need improvement, so I intend to study all the harder.

*White wins by 2½ points.*



*A triumphant Yamashita makes a live appearance on the satellite TV program covering the final game.*

#### Interview with Yamashita

*Monthly Go World:* You made a good recovery from your setbacks at the end of last year in the Oza and Tengen title matches. Did you do anything special?

YK: I myself didn't feel that I was in bad form. The only thing was that I wasn't getting the results I wanted. I thought it was strange, but the long and short of it is you lose because you

are weak. Forget what's past and just do your best, I thought, and it's a new year anyway. The only thing is to play with all your strength.

MGW: Two years ago, you lost the first three games in the Kisei match with Hane, won the next three, but then lost the final game.

YK: That match was on my mind. I was eager to get revenge.

MGW: We would like to review the course of the title match.

YK: In the first game, I made the position really tough for myself by not connecting at 40 in response to White 38 [Figure 2, page 49, *GW107*] and letting White make a ponnuki. The thickness Black built up to 45 in the bottom right corner was facing in the wrong direction.

MGW: But Hane later made an 'historic' blunder.

YK: Even without the blunder, I was already a tiny bit ahead. . . . In this game, patience paid off for me. That patience was embodied in my sealed move [73 in Figure 3, page 50, *GW107*]. This move wasn't very well received, but . . . while it may not be a move I can be proud of, it will stick in my memory.

MGW: Game 2 was considered a masterpiece for you. Hane, playing black, took the lead in territory, but you confronted him with thickness.

YK: The opening was reasonable for me and in general I was satisfied with my play, but I overdid things with 56 [in Figure 2, page 54, *GW107*].

MGW: Our commentator, Kobayashi Koichi, did say that you were trying too hard. . . . However, Hane went wrong soon afterwards, so you took the lead again. You called your sealed move in the first game a memorable move, and in this game Hane made a mistake with his sealed move. Recently games have been progressing so much on the first day that the sealed move comes in the middle of a decisive fight.

YK: This was a game I should have been able to win more easily. You have to wrap up games in which you have a won position properly.

MGW: Things got complicated in the opening of the third game.

YK: This game was even tougher for me than the first game. I was convinced that White couldn't extend at 44 [Figure 2, page 20], so I was surprised when Hane calmly played there. On rereading the position, I found I had been indulging in wishful thinking.

MGW: You had to change course with 47 —

*Continued on page 64*



# The 10th LG Cup Final: Gu Li vs. Chen Yaoye

## Games Four and Five

### Gu Li's first international title

The 10th LG Cup was a triumph for China, which took three of the semifinal places and won both games. The finalists were quite young. One was the 23-year-old Gu Li, who has come close to monopolizing the top place in the Chinese ratings list in the last two and a half years. It was well time that he won his first international title. However, when he finally reached his first final, he found the spotlight focused on his opponent, the 16-year-old prodigy Chen Yaoye.

Chen had made an extraordinary debut, reaching the final in his first international tournament; along the way, he picked up a win over the world's number one, Yi Ch'ang-ho. At 16 years four months, he had a chance to lower Yi's record for the youngest international title winner and to set a new record for the youngest 9-dan.

When Gu won the first two games of the title match, it looked as if he was going to pull rank and coast to a win. However, Chen brought the match alive by taking the third and fourth games. Gu prevailed in the fifth game, but his younger compatriot must have given him a real scare.

Below, we present the final two games of the match.

Game 1 (6 March). Gu (W) by resig.  
Game 2 (8 March). Gu (B) by resig.  
Game 3 (17 April). Chen (B) by 2½.  
Game 4 (19 April). Chen (W) by resig.  
Game 5 (21 April). Gu (B) by resig.

### Game Four: Chen fights back

**White:** Chen Yaoye 5-dan (China)

**Black:** Gu Li 7-dan (China)

Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each

Played in Seoul on 19 April 2006.

*Commentary by Michael Redmond 9-dan.*

### Figure 1 (1–50). An ineffective attack

Black's plan with 11 is to build up thickness in the top right, then switch to the invasion of 17. This is a forceful strategy, but trying to attack White's two-space extension on the right side is a little unreasonable. When White jumps out to 24, it doesn't feel as if Black has accomplished much.

White gets an efficient territory at the top; in contrast, Black's link on the right side up to 59 in Figure 2 is thin. White has taken the honours in the opening fight.




Figure 1 (1–50)




Figure 2 (51–100)  
72: ko

### Figure 2 (51–100). Shrewd play by Chen

Black attacks positively with 61 in an attempt to catch up.

White 68 looks a little dubious. Redmond: 'White should reinforce at 69. If Black 68, White blocks at A and gets a much thicker shape than in the game.'

When Black gets a stone at 71, the territory White was counting on at the bottom just about all disappears. Black has made a significant gain.

Black 75 and 77 look like the standard moves here, but, viewed in light of the subsequent play, they may be a little dubious. Black should give top priority to punishing White for his tenuki on the top left by playing 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1*. He is not afraid of the second approach move at 6, as 7 and 9 work perfectly.

In the game, White finishes off the top left in sente with 88, then switches to the 3-3 invasion of 90. This is shrewd play by Chen. Up to 98, White steals Black's base and his territory, so he takes the lead.

Black 99 is a do-or-die move. If White connects at B, Black will cut at C, leading the game into a confused fight. Redmond: 'If White used 100 to reinforce calmly at D, he would have a definite lead. However, wanting to punish the opponent for a tenuki is the natural psychology when actually playing.'

Even when Black gets a stone at 39, the white group on the side is alive locally, as shown in *Dia. 2*. However, if White answers Black 6 at 7, then Black is left with the eye-destroying move of 8. Both sides keep this aji in mind in the all-out fight that follows.





Figure 3 (101-150)

In retrospect, Black 43 is the losing move. If instead Black had played at 1 in *Dia. 3*, there is no telling who would have won. If White lives in sente with 6, Black becomes quite thick, which adversely affects the white group below. If this variation had been played, the game would probably have been tougher for White than for Black.

White 48 and 50 are a good combination.




*Dia. 1: Black's chance      Dia. 2: not alive*

**Figure 3 (101-150). Black goes wrong.**

With 30, White saves seven stones, but the eye shape of the whole group is not clear. Black's do-or-die move has sparked off a perilous fight.

Judging that a direct attack on the bottom white group won't achieve success, Black switches to the right side with 35. His aim is to engineer a double attack.



*Dia. 3: equal chances*






Figure 4 (151-200)  
ko: 93, 96, 99

**Figure 4 (151-200). More confusion**

When White connects at 52, Black has gained nothing from his attack.

The game is again plunged into confusion when a ko fight breaks out with 89.




Figure 5 (201-240)  
ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 34, 37

**Figure 5 (201-240). White keeps the lead.**

The game would be closer if Black played 29 at 32. Even so, White would keep a narrow lead.

**Figure 6 (241-276). Masterly play by Chen**

Chen safely steered his way through the con-

fusing fights in the latter part of this game and picked up a solid win.

*Black resigns after White 276.*

(Go Weekly, 1 May 2006. Report by Boku Michiyoshi.)




Figure 6 (241-276)

ko (over 42): 46, 49, 52, 55; 57: connects (at 42); 63: ko (below 60); 69: connects (below 67); 70: ko (at 60); 72: connects (below 60)

**Game Five: Gu's first title**

White: Chen Yaoye

Black: Gu Li

Played in Seoul on 21 April 2006.

Commentary by Michael Redmond 9-dan.

**Figure 1 (1-50). An aggressive start**

Gu Li has a fighting style, so he welcomes the outbreak of confused fighting. His forcing moves with 23 and 25 and his tenuki with 27 show that he is hoping to start a fight.

That being so, meeting the challenge head-on with 28 and 34 is just fighting spirit. Cutting at the vital point of 42 suddenly starts a perilous fight.

White 48 is certainly a big move, but here the atari of White 1 in *Dia. 1* would have been an effective strategy. Black may capture a stone with 2 and 4, but White becomes thick with 7. Redmond: 'The three white stones may have been captured, but they still have some vitality. Not only is White 'a' more or less sente, White also has scope to cut the black territory down to

size with 'b' and 'c'. This result would be good enough for White.'





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1: better for White





Figure 2 (51-100)

## Figure 2 (51-100). Outreading the opponent

Black is doing well when he can get a stone in place at 55 naturally. Gu Li's strategy has succeeded and he has taken the initiative.

Letting Black rap him on the head of two stones with 61 can't be good for White.

Apparently Chen thought that he could use 72 to follow *Dia. 2*. At a glance, White 5 seems to make miai of 'a' and 'b', but the counter of Black 6 protects against both these threats. Gu Li scores a success by outreading the opponent in a decisive fight.



Dia. 2: Chen's oversight

If one makes a positional evaluation after White 88, one finds that White has slightly more territory than Black in the top half of the board. However, Black has slightly more territory overall, thanks to having secured the bottom right and left corners. Moreover, White has a weak group in the centre, so the game is an easy one to play for Black.

Black 89 kills three birds with one stone: it reduces White's moyo, covers up Black's thinness in the centre, and takes aim at White's centre group.

Up to 98, White becomes thick in the centre, but now his right-side group is thin.



Chen Yaoye






Figure 3 (101-150)  
15: connects

Figure 3 (101-150). White slips further behind.

White 6. Forcing with White 11 is correct; connecting at A next will make miai of B and C, so Black will reinforce at A. In the game, Black gets to play at 11, so White loses some four points. Black harasses White severely up to 29 and expands his lead.





Figure 4 (151-200)

Figure 4 (151-200). An uneven exchange

Black 55 is an exquisite move but not an easy one to find. Making the capture of 61 sente is the deciding blow: victory for Black has now become certain.

Black 73 is the finishing blow. If White tries to escape with 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black captures him with 2 and 4.

In the game, White captures four stones up to 78, but Black has captured pivotal stones, so it's clear that he has profited.



Dia. 3: trapped




Figure 5 (201-237)

Figure 5 (201-237). A convincing win for Gu

In the end, Black has a lead of over 20 points on the board. Gu could not have asked for a better finish to the match.

Redmond: 'Chen did not show the flair apparent in the fourth game. Victory went to the player who handled the pressure better.'

Gu's first prize is 250,000,000 won; Chen had to be content with 80 million won, which is still not bad for someone in his mid-teens.


White resigns after Black 237.

(Go Weekly, 8 May 2006. Report by Boku Michiyoshi. LG report translated by John Power.)

# Life-and-death Problems

Below is a selection of some of the most interesting problems from recent issues of *Monthly Go World*. Some are kyu level and some are dan level — we'll let the reader decide which are which.


## Problem One



*Black to play and kill White*

The white group seems to have plenty of eye space, as it has captured three stones, but it can be killed.


## Problem Two



*Black to play and kill White*

White's shape looks a little frail, but Black still has to strike at the vital point to kill him.


## Problem Three



*Black to play and live*

This is a funny position: it's hard to know how much trouble Black is in. The answer is: only one move will secure unconditional life.


## Problem 4



*Black to play and kill White*

How can Black use his 'captured' stones to kill White?


## Problem 5



*Black to play and get a ko*


This position is artificial, but it's still good practice. Living outright may be too much to expect, but Black can at least avoid dying outright.

## Problem 6



*Black to play and live*

## Problem 7



*Black to play and kill White*

*Answers on page 51*



# The 19th Fujitsu Cup: New Korean Star Triumphs

This year's Fujitsu Cup was yet another triumph for Korea, which took three of the semifinal places and went on to win the title for the ninth year in a row. In this report, we present some of the most interesting games from the earlier rounds and also the final.

## Yamashita Keigo vs. Cho Han-seung (Round 1)

The game features dramatic large-scale trades and was the most spectacular in the opening round. It would take a very detailed commentary to do it full justice, but we hope the reader can get the flavour of the game from the commentary below.

**White:** Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan)  
**Black:** Cho Han-Seung 8-dan (Korea)  
 Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each  
 Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 8 April 2006.  
*Commentary by Kato Atsushi 8-dan.*





Figure 1 (1-50)  
 19: ko (at 9)

**Figure 1 (1-50).** *White comes under pressure.*

White 24 is the first turning point. White would get a more comfortable position if he first played at 'a' or 1 in *Dia. 1*. Kato: 'In the game, White doesn't play first in the centre. Rather, he waits for Black 25 to give him momentum for

escaping with 26. However, this does give Black the initiative and makes his moves easy to find, so White's strategy may be a little dubious.' His prospects don't look very bright when Black caps at 35.




*Dia. 1: less pressure on White*

Cho probably felt quite confident in his opening. After playing 35 and again later, he got up to walk around and look at the other games.

Black 37 is severe. Attacking with Black A is also tempting, but Black may feel a little dissatisfied when White settles his group with B—Black C—White D. Black 37 is certainly more aggressive.

White counterattacks with 38: he can't hope to win if he just flees from Black.



*Dia. 2: not what White wants*

**Figure 2 (51-85).** *Yamashita goes all out.*

White 52. Usually White would play the tesuji of 1 in *Dia. 2*. Black 2 and 4 are probable, so White can capture two stones and secure his group with 5 and 7. Kato surmised: 'White makes the judgement that the two-stone capture is small. Also, White takes gote; on top of that, Black solidifies his bottom area, so White can no longer do anything there, which is unsatisfactory.'

Even so, 'the result after 53 is painful for White. Black also strengthens his top centre position with 55, so he has nothing to be unhappy about. His game is developing smoothly.'




Figure 2 (51-85)

If Black can add a stone at A, he will secure the whole bottom right territory. For his part, White can lay waste to it if he gets a chance to play at B. The difference between Black A and White B is about 30 points. It's so big that playing here immediately would not be strange. Kato: 'The focus of the game in the subsequent play is the question of who gets to play first in the bottom right.'

White 56 is a thick move; it's also a probe. Kato: 'I would be quite happy to answer at C.' However, Cho switches elsewhere. White now sets his centre stones in motion with 58.


Kato: 'Playing tenuki when the opponent has made a probe is fighting spirit. However, it's a fact that White now feels encouraged.'

Black 59 leaves open the possibility of White 83, followed by a cut, but White will hurt his centre position if he goes through with this immediately. White moves to the left with 60, but he keeps one eye on the threat of White 83.


Black 75. The flow of the game would remain good for Black if he played 75 at 84, followed by White D-Black E-White F, then played at Black 75. Instead of connecting in response to 75, White goes all out with 76 to 84. The position has become a little complicated.

Nonetheless, the cut of Black 85 is severe. If White plays 86 at 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black answers

with 2 and 4 and keeps the lead (White 'a' is refuted by Black 'b'-White 'c'-Black 'd'). If instead White plays at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black counters with 2 etc. White can't win this capturing race.



*Dia. 3: White can't escape*



*Dia. 4: Black wins*

Kato: 'White would have lost the game if he had answered Black 75 by connecting. Permitting Black 85 is unavoidable.' Still, things look grim for White. How can he cope with this crisis?



Cho Han-seung

Born on 27 November 1982, Cho qualified as 1-dan in 1995 and was promoted to 8-dan in 2005. He reached the semifinals of the 7th (2003) and 8th (2004) LG Cups.






cult fight will follow if, instead of 2, White tries to kill Black with White 5. Being short of time, Cho perhaps lacked confidence in this variation.'


Kato: 'Black suffers a big loss when White captures half his group up to 22. White has pulled off an upset.'

Black 23, forestalling the squeeze mentioned earlier, is a big move. However, White now gets to play the long-awaited move of 24 at the bottom. This is the fourth benefit from his sacrifice.

White 28. White's lead would have been more definite if he had crawled at 1 in *Dia. 8*, according to Kato. If Black switches 2 to 2 in *Dia. 9*, White can live in the corner.



*Dia. 8: good for White*    *Dia. 9: good for White*



*Dia. 10: keeping things simple*

With 28 or 30 or 32, White should have played the forcing move of White 37. Because he forgot to do so, Black strikes with 33.


White 38. Following *Dia. 10* would be simpler, but Yamashita doesn't want to lose the aji of the squeeze, so he lets Black bring his centre top group back to life and instead captures the top right black group.

Kato: 'Up to 47, the gap narrowed, which gave me a jolt, but it didn't amount to a counter-upset by Black.'

White 50. White 51 would probably secure a win by the komi.


Black's counter at 51 caused the spectators a

few nervous moments, but 'the hane on top at 54 is a strong move. If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 11*, he can live in the corner, but this life is small — up to 8, Black doesn't profit' (Kato).



*Dia. 11: no gain*

*Dia. 12: 1 backfires*



*Figure 5 (156-210).*

89: ko (at 81); 94: ko (at 86)

**Figure 5 (156-210). A spectacular game**

Black 59. Black would like to play at 1 in *Dia. 12*, but this falls into a trap up to 10.

Kato: 'If anything, Black has lost points from his counterattack beginning with 51 in the previous diagram. When White lives solidly up to 72 at the bottom, the game is in the bag.'

Cho keeps trying, doing his best to pull off something, but he can't come up with the goods.

With the successive trades, this game underwent dizzying transformations. Yamashita got off to an unfavourable start, but he played patiently, then seized his chance to stage a spectacular upset.

*Black resigns after White 210.*

(Adapted from the *Yomiuri Newspaper*)



## Yi Se-tol vs. Cho Chikun (Round 2)

This game was short but fiery. Cho Chikun resigned when he got into what he thought was a losing capturing race, but he (and nearly all the players following the game) overlooked a truly remarkable tesuji that would have saved his bacon.

Just for the record, this was Cho's first game with Yi. In contrast to Cho, the latter is a very quick player, who takes almost no time over most of his moves. Occasionally in this game he thought for four or five minutes and just once (on 97) for ten. Cho's slowest move was 42, on which he spent 57 minutes or nearly a third of his time.

**White:** Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan)

**Black:** Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea)

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 10 April 2006.

*Commentary by Tono Hiroaki 9-dan.*




Figure 1 (1-50)

### Figure 1 (1-50). Cho's overplay

Black 21 is an unfamiliar move. Usually Black would make an approach move at A; presumably Yi disliked the prospect of White B.

White 34 is aggressive, but it leaves White with very bad *aji*. After the forced continuation to 41, Black exploits the bad *aji* with 43 on.

White 50 is forced. If instead White connects to the right of 44, he will collapse after Black 50.

The trade to 51 in Figure 2 is clearly favourable for Black, whose profit outweighs White's thickness.

### Figure 2 (51-78). A tough game for White

White 52 is not really the right direction of play, as the thickness Black builds in the centre in the continuation menaces White's weak group there. One would usually expect White A; perhaps White doesn't play there because this gives Black an excellent peep at B, which will force White to make bad shape.





Figure 2 (51-78)

White 64 represents a difficult decision. As far as the left side is concerned, exchanging C for Black D, then enclosing with E would make it harder for Black to invade.

Black 65 and 67 are clever: Black secures unconditional life instead of resorting to the *ko* shown in *Dia. 1*.

Cho makes a modest reduction of the right side with 74. White F would be more severe, but would invite a counterattack at G. However, Black 75 and 77 secure a territory of about 70 points, which White will be hard put to match even if White 78 secures all the left side.



### Figure 3 (79-100). A moyo contest

Black 89, invading a large moyo, looks like a

typical Cho move, but this time he's on the receiving end.

White 100. White doesn't have enough ko threats to fight the ko shown in *Dia. 2*.




Figure 3 (79-100)




Figure 4 (101-117)


#### Figure 4 (101-117). The unplayed brilliancy

Cho (who had been in byo-yomi since 78 in Figure 2) resigned when he saw Black 17: he could see no move for White. He must have been shocked when his opponent pointed out the counter of White A to him. This is a spectacular first-line tesuji that would have made the game a memorable one if it had been played.


Before explaining A, let's look at the ordi-

nary moves.

*Dia. 3.* If White 1 and 3, White is captured after 6. The trick is for Black to play 4 before 6.




*Dia. 3: captured*




*Dia. 4: captured*

*Dia. 4.* Playing at 1 first doesn't help. Again, the timing of 4 and 6 is crucial.

*Dia. 5.* White 3 doesn't work because of White's shortage of liberties.



*Dia. 5: captured*



*Dia. 6: the tesuji  
11: connects*

*Dia. 6.* White 1 is a brilliant move that prevents Black from linking up. Black can live with part of his group, but White captures the stones on the inside in sente. He could then continue with 15 and 17. Actually, he would still be a little behind, but at least it would be worth fighting on. Please confirm for yourself that Black has no direct answer to White 1.

While the renowned players in the pressroom missed this move, it was discovered by an unsung 6-dan, Tsuruyama Atsushi, who is a disciple of Cho's. His teacher could have used his help.

*White resigns after Black 117.*

(Adapted from the Yomiuri Newspaper.)



## Yamashita Keigo vs. Yi Ch'ang-ho (Round 2)

Yi Ch'ang-ho has turned 30, so his days as a child prodigy are well behind him, but the impact of his debut on the world stage as a teenager (he was 13 when he first played in this tournament) made a big contribution to the aura he emits. For several years now his citadel has been under siege by younger Korean stars, but even the most successful of them, Yi Se-tol, dismisses any suggestion he has displaced the older Yi as the world's number one.

In this game, Yi lays the groundwork for victory with a brilliant probe played as early as the 20th move.

**White:** Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

**Black:** Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan)

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 10 April 2006.

*Commentary by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. Report by Takami Ryoko.*





Figure 1 (1-30)



Dia. 1: the ladder

**Figure 1 (1-30). A brilliant probe**


White 6 shows that Yi has decided to counter

Black's high corner enclosure with a profit-oriented policy. Note that the precondition for this move is that, if Black uses 11 to follow the joseki in *Dia. 1*, the ladder after 11 must favour White.


White 20. At this point, the natural continuation on the left is White 22-Black 25-White 26. However, Yi comes up with an exquisitely timed probe that filled all the professionals following the game with admiration.

Black 21. If Black places weight on the corner with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, White will continue with 4, discarding the two stones [10 and 18] in the centre. He builds a nice position at the top up to 14.

Black naturally avoids this diagram, but, when he counters with 21, White sets his centre stones in motion with 22. The exchange of 20 for 21 clearly makes 20 a forcing move [White reduces the top from the centre with 22 and 30, but is left with the option of living in the corner].



Dia. 2: satisfactory for White



Dia. 3: Kataoka's suggestion

Kataoka: 'Both the diagram and the sequence in the game are what White wants, so I would prefer to play 21 at 1 in *Dia. 3*.' If White 2,

Black switches to the large point of 3. White 4 and Black 5 can be expected. This would be more promising for Black than the game.




Figure 2 (31-68)

**Figure 2 (31-68).** *White takes the lead.*

Black 31 just helps give White momentum. Yamashita said later he should have peeped at 41, as at this stage White would have to connect at A; he could then jump to 31. Yi commented that in that case he planned to play at B.

Kataoka: 'If White played B and Black played at 32, Black would get about 40 points at the top, so the position would be even. In the game, White 32 is really big; already, it's not an easy game for Black.' Yamashita agreed: 'My play was slack.'


Black 41 was endorsed by O Meien 9-dan, who was giving a public commentary on the game, as 'the only move'. With White having taken the lead in all four corners, Black has to stake the game on harassing the centre group. However, Black 43 is another move the player regretted, saying: 'I should have answered at 51.'

Kataoka: 'If Black 51-White B-Black 47 were played, Black couldn't expect to make a strong attack on White, but this would still be much better than the game.'


White 44 is a good move that punishes Black for his mistake. Black would like to answer at 1 in *Dia. 4*, but, after exchanging 2 for 3, White will answer underneath at 4. Black may capture four stones, but the moyo White makes up to 10 is superior.

Kataoka: 'Black 45 is forced to avoid the sequence in *Dia. 4*, but this is painful for Black.'

Whatever happens later, Black 45 will be a bad move. Black helps White to link up with 46, then, because of his own shortage of liberties, has to play at 53. Normally, Black would prefer to continue the attack with 53 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, but White has the fierce peep of 4. Black loses the capturing race after 14.



*Dia. 4: good for White*



*Dia. 5: White wins*


Kataoka: 'After 56, rather than being a target for attack, the centre white group functions as thickness. The game has become even tougher for Black.'

White's tight move at 58 shows that he is intent on avoiding complications. Yi's forte is wrapping up a win once he takes the lead. White 60 and 62 are played in the same spirit. Kataoka: 'White doesn't do anything. He leaves no chink in his armour for the opponent to aim at.' As O Meien put it in his public commentary, 'Yi has become a tortoise.'

White 64 is a thick move; it forestalls Black C, aiming at D.

White 68 is a steady move. Dipping down like this might seem timid, but the ordinary move of 1 in *Dia. 6* (next page) would leave Black with the threat of 2 etc. Black 6 makes miai of living and linking up.





Dia. 6: corner aji






Figure 3 (69-100)



Dia. 7: good for White



Dia. 8: disaster

9: connects

### Figure 3 (69-100). Avoiding all complications

Black 69. Kataoka: 'There's no longer anywhere else to play.' Yi has settled the shape and limited the scope for complications, so Yamashita has nowhere to exert his strength to stage an upset. White is on course for a sure win.

White 70 shows Yi's confidence in his lead — otherwise, he would leave scope for an invasion at the bottom.

White 74 is severe. Kataoka: 'White can do whatever he likes, as all his other positions are strong.'

Black 75. Black would like to fight back against White's attachment, but, 'Things probably won't work out well,' as Yamashita said after the game.

Black 75 at 1 in Dia. 7 is a standard move, but (Kataoka) 'the forcing moves are satisfactory for White. Since he is behind, Black can't play like this. He can't win this way . . . The only thing is, as Yamashita said, one can't find any other ways to resist.'

Yi spent 22 minutes on 76, making it his slowest move of the game.

Black 81. Black would like to play at 1 in Dia. 8, but White hits him with the cut of 4; up to 10, Black collapses. 'But playing 3 at 8 would be too submissive. It's painful for Black if he can't cut on top at 3' (Kataoka). In other words, Black has no choice about 81.

Black builds thickness in sente up to 92, but White takes a large profit. Kataoka: 'This result makes it easier for White to count.'

Black 95. If Black tries to apply pressure in the centre with A, White will make the large sliding move at B. Black 95 is therefore natural.

With 96 on, Yi chooses 'the most solid strategy' (Kataoka).





Figure 4 (101-150)

### Figure 4 (101-150). Black's last challenge

White 8 attempts to wrap up the game. If Black made the usual answer with 1 etc. in Dia. 9, White would keep sente, then make a comfortable position in the centre with 6.

As he is behind in territory, Black's only hope is to harass the centre group, so he switches to 9.



Dia. 9: losing without fighting

Black 15 is the vital point for attacking White's eye shape. If White answers by connecting at A, Black pushes down at 21, creating complications, but the wedge of 16 is a calm, steady counter.

Kataoka: 'Up to 27, Black reaps quite a harvest, swallowing up a stone and blocking off the centre. However, he was too far behind before that.'

Yi had already made all the calculations: he knew that his lead would not be upset if he ceded some profit to Black in the centre fight, but took sente and played first at the top.

Black 29. Permitting White 29 would be unbearable.

White 32 is the decisive point. White not only takes territory but also makes miai of B and 44, which means that the centre group is completely secure. That destroys Black's last hope.

Black 35 is big, but it is miai with 38. If Black played 35 at 40, White would block at 37 instead of answering the atari, and Black would lose points.

#### Figure 5 (151–200). Yi's solid endgame

Black gets no chance to catch up in this figure — the outcome has already been decided.

#### Figure 6 (201–248). A safe win

Yi took a big lead in the opening, thanks to his clever probe and Yamashita's strategic errors with 31 and 43 in Figure 2. When Yamashita played 31, O Meien said in his simultaneous public commentary: 'If Black loses this game, I think he's going to regret this move.' That was a prescient comment.

From the middle game on, Yi concentrated on playing solidly and denying his opponent any chance to get back into contention. The final margin may seem narrow, but Yi was never in any danger of falling behind.

This was the fourth game between these two — so far Yi has proved an insurmountable barrier for Yamashita.

White wins by  $2\frac{1}{2}$  points.

(Adapted from the *Yomiuri Newspaper*. Fujitsu report translated by John Power.)




Figure 5 (151–200)




Figure 6 (201–248)



Yi Ch'ang-ho



# Final Pak Cheong-sang vs. Zhou Heyang



*The unheralded Pak Cheong-sang surprised everyone by reaching the final in his Fujitsu debut. It was no fluke: along the way, he beat such top players as Hane Naoki, Chang Hao, and Ch'oe Ch'eol-han.*

**White:** Park Cheong-sang 9-dan (Korea)

**Black:** Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China)

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 3 April 2006.

*Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan. Report by Sekine Shingo.*




Figure 1 (1–50)

**Figure 1 (1–50).** *Zhou is satisfied.*

The pattern to 13 has been popular recently in China and Korea.

White 14. White 36 would just invite Black A–White 42–Black B. Black plays on both sides and seizes the initiative.

Black 15 makes a corner enclosure combined with a checking extension. It may not actually make the position favourable for Black, but it feels good.

Black 27. KS: ‘I would prefer to attack with C.’

Black 33 is too tight. KS: ‘Defending on the right side with Black 38 or 48 would be usual. Black has already strengthened the centre top group with 31, so one doesn’t feel like adding another stone at 33.’

The commentator and one of the players had completely different opinions about the sequence from Black 39 to 55 in Figure 2. Pak commented that he was grateful for 39 and 41. ‘I would have disliked it more if Black had held back at B. If White links up with D, Black switches to 44 or a second approach move in the bottom left, and the position doesn’t look bad for him. Black takes gote up to 43. I felt that the game was easier for White when I got sente and switched to 44.’

Pak is good at the endgame and confident in the mathematical side of positional judgement, which is why he was happy to get to play first on the bottom right.

KS: ‘There’s probably nothing wrong with 39. The hane of 45 is severe, and White has no choice about 46. If instead he played at E, Black would hane at F; after White G, the cut of Black 48 is severe. Black 47 is another good move. White is forced to make bad shape with 48, on top of which, weak points are left behind in the centre top white group.’

Zhou also expressed himself as satisfied with the result on the right side.

**Figure 2 (51–75).** *Zhou is too steady.*

Black 53 and 55 are steady moves. KS: ‘This strategy shows that Black is confident in his position. The only thing is that I think he could also have started a fight as in *Dia. 1*.’ This kind of fight might decide the game at one blow. One can’t say which way of playing is better, however — it depends on the player’s individual judgement.

Most Chinese players are fairly aggressive, but Zhou is the exception; he is a calm, steady player. However, there are limits to how peaceful

one should be. Kobayashi was severe on Black 61. 'This is a move that probably not one professional in the world will admire. Black should just have played the usual move of 1 in *Dia. 2*, fighting a ko. White doesn't have any ko threats, so he will probably extend at 6. Black expands the centre with 7 and 9, and it's an even game.'

A comparison of the result to 68 with the diagram shows that in the game the two white stones on the left side have linked up and so have had an easy time of it.





Figure 2 (51-75)  
64: connects (at 57)




Dia. 1: a game-deciding fight

KS: 'Black has influence lying in wait at the top, so there shouldn't be much difference in strength between the [two] left-side white stones

and the bottom left black group, yet ...'

After 68, Black would really prefer to add a stone at A, but, presumably realizing that he is behind in territory, Zhou pins his hope on applying pressure to the bottom right white group. Another potentially decisive ko fight starts with 75.



Dia. 2: a favourable ko fight for Black  
5: ko



Zhou Heyang's path to his first Fujitsu final was perhaps even more impressive than Pak's: he defeated three top Korean players, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok, Pak Yeong-hun, and Yi Se-tol, who among them have won 14 international titles. However, there was a lot of pressure on him. Chinese officials were saying that if China won this title, on top of their other triumphs this year, it would prove that they had caught up with Korea. All the weight of his country's expectations was on Zhou's shoulders.






Figure 3 (76-100)  
ko: 79, 88, 91, 94, 97, 100

**Figure 3 (76-100). Not much pressure on White**

If Black wins this ko the white group may die, but White will be able to ignore a purely territorial ko threat, as he has the lead.




Figure 4 (101-150)

**Figure 4 (101-150). Pak's magnificent reading**

White can afford to ignore Black 1. He keeps his lead even if he permits Black 3. However, White 6 is a careless slip, an example of 'selfish reading' (*katte-yomi*). Presumably White thought that Black would play 9 at A, letting him capture at B in sente; however, B will be gote after Black ataries from the centre at 9. Pak: 'This cost me


three or four points. I got angry with myself.'

The game has become close, but now it's Black's turn to play sloppily, that is, with 11 to 15.

Pak related after the game that just when he was upset with himself he was able to regain his composure when he saw 11 to 15. Pak: 'If instead of 11 Black had capped at 17, deferring the decisive fight, I probably wouldn't have been able to compose myself. White may have still been ahead, but if it had become an endgame contest I wouldn't have been able to put aside my regrets about the loss I suffered on the right side.'

With 11 etc., Black makes an unreasonable attempt to enclose the top and centre that backfires, giving White a chance to wrap up a win.

Pak thought for 23 minutes on 16, his slowest move of the game. Pak: 'I thought that this fight would decide the game. I read out all the ensuing variations. This was the tensest period for me in the final.'



Dia. 3: not enough for Black


The sequence from 16 to 23 is a one-way street. If Black uses 19 to enclose on the more modest scale shown in Dia. 3, he will lose by the komi.

During his analysis before playing 16, Pak came to three conclusions: 1. if White captures two stones with 26, Black gets a stone at 29, turning the top left corner into ko; 2. White can fight this ko because he has the ko threat at 68 in the next figure; if Black finishes off the ko [which actually transfers to a smaller one], a second successive move at White 70 will kill the bottom left black group. In short, Pak coolly read out the path to victory; Ishida Yoshio praised this performance as 'magnificent'.

*Concluded on page 53.*

## Life-and-death Problems: Answers


### Answer to Problem One



*Dia. 1: correct*


*Dia. 1.* The placement of Black 1 is a clever move. If White blocks Black's way out with 2, Black 3 makes miai of 4 and 5, killing White either way. Instead of 2 —

*Dia. 2.* If White 2, Black links up with 3. White will be reduced to a three-point eye, so his group is dead.



*Dia. 2: dead*

*Dia. 3.* Black 1 is wrong: White has enough room for two eyes now.



*Dia. 3: wrong*

*Dia. 4: wrong timing*


*Dia. 4.* Playing Black 1 first is a mistake: White lives with 2 to 6. If instead Black plays 1 at 5, White blocks at 3 and lives.

### Answer to Problem Two


*Dia. 1.* Black 1 is the vital point — White now has no way of living.

*Dia. 2.* White 2 is the natural answer, but Black counters with 3. If White 4, Black kills him with 5 and 7. Instead of 4 —


*Dia. 3.* White 4 doesn't help. Black squeezes, then connects at 11, killing White.




*Dia. 1: correct*



*Dia. 2: dead*




*Dia. 3: dead  
10: connects*




*Dia. 4: dead*

*Dia. 4.* White may play 2, hoping Black will be satisfied with capturing two stones. However, Black can still kill him with 7 (an atari instead would let White live).

*Dia. 5.* Black 1 is often the vital point, but not here. White calmly connects at 2 and lives.




*Dia. 5: wrong tesuji*



*Dia. 6: alive*

*Dia. 6.* Black 1 makes it easy for White.


### Answer to Problem Three



*Dia. 1: ko*


*Dia. 1.* Black 1 is the instinctive move, because this diagonal connection is often a good way to make eye shape. However, White has the sharp placement of 2. The continuation is forced, and Black has no choice but to fight a ko after 9.





*Dia. 2: correct*

*Dia. 2.* Black 1 is the only move. White 2 is natural, but Black ignores it, playing 3; this forces White 4, so Black 5 makes miai of a second eye with 6 or 7. Instead of 2 —




*Dia. 3: alive*


*Dia. 3.* If White 2, Black 3 makes miai of 4 and 5, so Black is alive.

#### Answer to Problem 4

*Dia. 1.* The instinctive move is Black 1, which is often a tesuji, especially in the endgame — if White blocks at 'a', Black fights a ko with 'b'. However, this is not an endgame problem. Next —




*Dia. 1: wrong*




*Dia. 2: alive*

*Dia. 2.* White lives with 2 to 6. Black can do better than this.

*Dia. 3.* Black descends at 1. White now looks suspiciously short of liberties on both sides.




*Dia. 3: the tesuji*



*Dia. 4: can't atari*

*Dia. 4.* If White 2, now is the right time for the placement of 3 — White's shortage of liberties is fatal. Instead of 2 —




*Dia. 5: dead*


*Dia. 5.* White 2 doesn't help. After 3, White can't block at 5, as Black will just atari these stones, but if 4 he dies anyway.

#### Answer to Problem 5

*Dia. 1.* Black 1 fails when White makes a placement at 2. White has a clever continuation with 4 etc. that kills Black.



*Dia. 1: wrong*




*Dia. 2: wrong*


*Dia. 2.* Black 1 also fails: he can't get two eyes after 2 and 4.

The above are the moves one would look at first, as they are the obvious 'shape' moves. Since they both fail —


*Dia. 3.* Black has to try something different. Black 1 doesn't seem to promise a lot of eye shape, but it is best. Next —



*Dia. 3: correct*



*Dia. 4: ko*



*Dia. 5: ko*


*Dia. 4.* The best White can do is to get a ko with 2 to 5. This is the correct answer.

*Dia. 5.* Playing 2 first leads to the same result. White can't do better than a ko — if White


4 at 'a', Black gets a ko with 5; if instead White 4 at 5, Black lives with 'a'.

### Answer to Problem 6

*Dia. 1.* Black 1 is the only move. Next, 'a' and 'b' are miai, so Black is alive.



*Dia. 1: correct*




*Dia. 2: wrong*

*Dia. 2.* Black 1 looks natural — except that White can attach at 2 and can't be captured.


### Answer to Problem 7

*Dia. 1.* Black 1 is the vital point. Next —


*Dia. 2.* If White plays at 3 or 5, Black cuts at 2 and kills him, so he must play at 2. However, Black ruins his shape with 3, then 5 makes miai of two cutting points.




*Dia. 1: correct*



*Dia. 2: dead*



*Dia. 3: wrong*



*Dia. 4: wrong*


*Dia. 3.* If Black 1, White dips down with 2 and can make two eyes.

*Dia. 4.* Black 1 is also wrong: White 2.

(In order, the problems come from the following issues of *Monthly Go World*: 05/4, 06/6, 06/2, 06/4, 06/5, 06/5, 06/5. Translated by John Power.)

## The 19th Fujitsu Cup Final

*Continued from page 50*



*Figure 5 (151–180)*

*ko: 55, 58, 61, 64; 69: connects (below 67)*

### Figure 5 (151–180). A brilliant debut

Zhou resigned on seeing White 180. Whether or not it was because of the pressure on him, he was unable to display his usual tenacity.

Pak could not have had a better debut in the Fujitsu Cup. At one stroke, he made up the lost ground between himself and contemporaries like Pak Yeong-hun and Ch'oe Ch'eol-han. Thanks to him, Korea extended its monopoly in this tournament to nine years. It will be interesting to follow his further progress on the international scene.

*Black resigns after White 180.*


(Adapted from the *Yomiuri Newspaper*. *Fujitsu* report translated by John Power.)





# Tesujis for a Brighter Future


## 5. The wedge



*The wedge*


The wedge is a dynamic tesuji that exploits weaknesses in the opponent's connectivity. It's used for various purposes, most often for cutting off enemy stones or leading them into shortage of liberties. It appears frequently in actual play and is a tesuji the defending side always has to watch out for. Skilful use of it is probably a sign that you are ready to enter the dan ranks.

The diagram above shows a simple example: the two white stones are trapped after 1.




*Example A*

The one-space jump is particularly vulnerable to a wedge that seeks to cut off some stones. After Black 1, White can't save the two marked stones.




*Example B*

Black 1 strikes at the weak point of White's shape: it's a sharp tesuji that attacks the two marked stones. If next White 'a', Black plays 'b' and captures the two stones. Instead of 'a' —



*Ref. Dia. 1*


*Ref. Dia. 1.* If White 2, Black extends at 3, exploiting White's shortage of liberties. Black 5 could also be at 'a'.



*Ref. Dia. 2*

*Ref. Dia. 2.* Black 1 and 3 are plodding moves, the epitome of crude style. White saves his pivotal stones with 2 and 4, so Black fails to link up his groups. All he does is to capture a junk stone with 5 and 7.


### Problem One



*Black to play*

White probably thinks he's captured the three black stones in the corner and the four to the left. How can you disillusion him?


### Problem Two



Black to play

How can Black extricate his long string of stones?


### Problem Three



Black to play

As it stands, Black doesn't have enough room in the corner to live, so he will have to exploit a weak point in the opponent's shape. However, Black 'a' gains nothing when White answers at 'b'; Black 'c' instead is refuted by White 'b'. Black has to do better.


### Problem 4



Black to play

Black can't link up simply by sliding to 'a'. He has to do something to alter the dynamics of the position.

### Problem 5




Black to play

White has just played the marked stone, which he thinks will serve to link up his stones. Black has a sharp counter, but the timing is important.


### Answers

#### Answer to Problem One



Dia. 1: the tesuji

Dia. 1. The wedge of 1 is a sharp move — at one stroke, it reduces White's liberties.




Dia. 2: Black wins

Dia. 2. White 2 is the only move, but when Black plays 3 and 5 he is one move ahead in the capturing race.




### Answer to Problem Two




Dia. 1: a sacrifice

Dia. 1. Black 'a' might look like a tesuji, but there is no follow-up when White answers at 'b'. The correct move is, of course, a wedge; Black 1 is a sacrifice.



Dia. 2: linked up

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black 3 is the decisive move. White must play 4, so now the tesuji of 5 works.



Dia. 3: unavailing

Dia. 3. Resisting with White 2 doesn't help: White just loses the three stones at the bottom.


### Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. It's easy to guess that Black 1 is the answer; the aim is somehow to make Black 'a' sente.


Dia. 2. White has no choice but to capture a stone with 2 and 4, whereupon Black descends to 5 in sente. He then lives with 7.

Dia. 3. Actually, Black can change the timing, making the descent to 1 first. If White tries


to kill him with 2 and 4, Black captures three stones in an *oi-otoshi*.



Dia. 1: wedge




Dia. 2: alive



Dia. 3: alternative

### Answer to Problem 4




Dia. 1: can't connect


Dia. 1. This diagram confirms that Black can't link up with 1: White cuts across the knight's move with 2, which is a standard tesuji.

Dia. 2. Black 1 is actually a *hanekomi* rather than a wedge (*warikomi*), but the function is essentially the same. If next White 2, Black can now link up with 3. Next —

Dia. 3. White can still play the tesuji of 4, but he now makes only a minor gain. The presence of the *hanekomi* stone means that Black can link up on the edge with 5 and 7.




*Dia. 2: correct*




*Dia. 3: connected*

*Dia. 4.* White might counter with 2 to 6, but Black cuts him off with 7. If next White 2–Black ‘a’–White ‘b’, Black can break out into the centre.



*Dia. 4: Black wins*


### Answer to Problem 5






# The Korean Style: Korean Joseki Innovations (12)

by Oya Koichi 9-dan



*Dia. 1: the wedge*

*Dia. 1.* In the previous instalment, we looked at the variations when White plays 1 at 3. I would now like to analyse the intercepting move of 1. The sequence to 6 has become a joseki in Japan. Instead of 3, simply connecting at 5 is also possible — we will look at the variations in our next instalment. In this issue, I want to explore the variations after the wedging move of 3.




*Dia. 2: the pincer*


*Dia. 2.* In order to make best use of his stored-up thickness, White naturally wants to make a pincer. How about White 1? Black hane and connects with 2 and 4. There's a strong possibility he will make this answer even if White plays 1 at 'a'.

*Dia. 3.* The result in *Dia. 2* is the same as if Black 1 and White 2 were played here and the joseki to 11 followed. Pushing along with White 12 is not a very admirable move. Black 13 may

be jeered at as a cowardly move, but White 14 is a bad move, filling in his own liberties. White 16, leaving behind a weak point at 'a', is also dubious. The result in *Dia. 2* looks a little unsatisfactory for White.



*Dia. 3: tewari*



*Dia. 4: a fierce fight*

*Dia. 4.* What if White makes the wider pincer of 1? White won't be upset if Black makes the hane at 'a' plus connection now. Both sides will be more interested in the possibility of Black 2 and 4. The continuation to 7 is a one-way street — the game looks like turning into a fierce fight. However, there is a precondition for 2 and 4.

*Dia. 5.* If Black has an ally in the bottom left, as in this opening, he can secure a reasonable result to 7. The game still looks a little easier for White, though, as his two stones retain some aji.


*Dia. 6.* Even if the ladder favours him, White mustn't play at 1. The reason is that Black 2 will give him a jolt. If White 3 at 4, Black 3 will be troublesome.

Isn't there something a little better for Black?


*Dia. 7.* It would be nice if Black could force with 2. White 3 really looks clumsy. Black now moves out into the centre in fine style with 4. The only thing is that this is self-indulgent reading.

*Dia. 8.* White has a good answer: the counter-


peep of 2. If Black 3, White defends his cutting point in sente with 4, then captures a stone with 6. Thanks to 2, Black has fallen a step behind, compared to *Dia. 7*. This result doesn't make sense for Black.



*Dia. 5: reasonable for Black*



*Dia. 6: tricking oneself*




*Dia. 7: self-indulgent reading*


*Dia. 9.* Instead of connecting, Black 3 and 5 look more reasonable. The 1–2 exchange has created a little aji for Black, so the result is probably equal.

*Dia. 10.* If Black cuts at 1 and White answers with 2, the hane of 3 feels good. If White blocks


at 'a', Black of course hits him with the tesuji of 'b'. Depending on the surrounding position, it might also be possible for Black to connect at 2 instead of 1.



*Dia. 8: counter-peep*




*Dia. 9: par for the course*



*Dia. 10: Black's aji*

Leaving bad aji behind is depressing: Korean and Japanese professionals feel the same way about this. Please think about how you would continue after *Dia. 1* if you were White.






*Dia. 11: the descent*

*Dia. 11.* White descends at 1. Having lost the hane and connection, Black must extend to 2. White naturally jumps into the corner with 3.

All of a sudden, we find ourselves confronted with a life-and-death problem. If the corner group is captured, Black has to resign on the spot, so he must handle this situation with care.




*Dia. 12: the Japanese version*

*Dia. 12.* In Japan, Black uses the attachment of 1 to settle himself. The most frightening counter is White 2 and 4, but the ladder with 6 doesn't work.

*Dia. 13.* The hane of 2 is White's only move. Black plays 3 to 7, then lives in sente with 9. White gets excellent thickness, but 'sente' is very attractive for Black. He switches to 11 and can claim to have developed rapidly in this opening.

Even in Japan, where thickness is prized, we would favour Black in this position.


Perhaps some of my readers may think that Black 1 in *Dia. 12* is unnecessarily difficult and that there must be a simpler way of living. However, I'm going to be firm on this: Black 1 is the only move.




*Dia. 13: rapid development*

*Dia. 14.* Black could also live with 1 and 3. H'm. Looks simple — no way you could go wrong. Wait a minute! After the sequence to 10, Black has to add a move at 11. That means White is the one to get sente. That's too big a difference. The whole point of Black 1 in *Dia. 12* was to take sente.

Well, let's see how the Koreans settle Black's group.




*Dia. 14: gote*



*Dia. 15: the Korean style*

*Dia. 15.* Black 1 looks really typical of the Korean style. If White plays 2, Black counters with 3 to 7, and White can't defend all his cutting points. This is not satisfactory for White.


*Dia. 16.* This variation is from a game. Just look at the moves to 24 without saying anything. You wouldn't find a player in Japan who would want to hold Black. White's thickness is like a wall of steel. Black has just linked up on the first line and surrounded a tiny territory. The two black stones can also be captured [think about how before looking at the diagram given at the end of this article].



*Dia. 16: well balanced?*

In Korea, it's considered that Black 25 makes the result balanced. Their assessment is that it's an even game. I won't say anything. I'll leave it to the reader's judgement.

I'd like to wrap up this instalment with two supplementary points.



*Dia. 17: being pushed around*


*Dia. 17.* Making the wider extension to 1 leaves more chinks in White's position. To give one example, Black caps at 2, then, after forcing with 4, hanes at 6. White will feel as if he's turned the other cheek and been slapped on it too. This is a sad result.

*Dia. 18.* White 1 offers the strongest resistance. After Black 8, White can get a ladder with 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c', so Black has to play 8 at 'b', letting White connect at 8.


*Dia. 19.* To backtrack a little, in positions like this one, Fujisawa Shuko recommends playing at Black 1. Since Black doesn't have any allies at the bottom, he doesn't mind losing the threat of the hane of Black 'a' when White forces with 2. Moreover, he can aim at 5 later, which

turns 2 into a bad move. Shuko's insight is impressive.

(Kido, June 1999. Translated by John Power.)




*Dia. 18: aiming at a ladder*



*Dia. 19: Shuko's suggestion*

Finally, the answer to the life-and-death problem.

*Dia. 20.* The throw-in at 1 exploits Black's shortage of liberties. After 5, he won't have enough time to link up all his stones.



*Dia. 20: captured*



# Key Points in the Opening


Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

*This is the article referred to in our commentary on Game Three of the Kisei title match. The text is by Konishi Taizo 8-dan.*

## The evolving Chinese Opening

Black can take the initiative in deciding what kind of opening to play when occupying the four corners, that is, he can choose between parallel formation and diagonal formations. If he wants to make the most of his advantage of having the first move by building up a large-scale position, he will most often adopt a parallel formation (for example, 1 and 3 in the theme diagram; playing Black 3 in the bottom left corner would give a diagonal formation). The chances are (though it's by no means an ironclad rule) that a diagonal formation will lead to the board being split up into a number of small-scale black and white positions.

The representative parallel formations are the sanrensei (three star-point stones in a row) and the Chinese Opening. In this article, Kobayashi Koichi, who has been playing the Chinese Opening a lot recently, discusses an interesting strategic innovation.




Theme diagram

*The Chinese Opening emphasizes speed and balance. There are many counterstrategies, of which White 6 is one of the newest. (White: Wang Lei 8-dan; Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan. 5th Nong Shim Cup. 12 November 2003.)*


*Theme diagram. KK: 'Black 1 to 5 are the so-called Chinese Opening. Black omits a corner enclosure and hastens to occupy the large point of 5. He emphasizes the balance with his stone at the top. This sense of speed is one of the features of the Chinese Opening. White 6 is a new strategy; my first experience of it came when it was played against me by Wang Lei of China.'*

White's aim is to prevent Black from extending sideways from his Chinese Opening formation; previously, the moves from A to E had been played for this purpose. In this article, we look at the meaning of the innovation of 6 and at Black's counters.



Dia. 1: a calm strategy

*Dia. 1. In the past, White 1 has been quite popular. White builds up a position at the bottom with 3; this is a calm, steady strategy. Instead of Black 2 —*




Dia. 2: Black's counter

*Dia. 2. KK: 'The counterattack of 2 looks severe. White tries to settle himself by attaching at 3, but Black exerts his strength with 4 to 12. This result is not good for White.'*


*Dia. 3. If White 1, Black splits him into two with 2 and takes the initiative.*

*Dia. 4. White 1 has also been experimented with. If Black plays 2 at 'a', White attaches at 'b'*


and easily settles himself (it's a little crude, but exchanging Black 'c' for White 'd' before playing at 'a' has also been tried). In this variation, White gets the two-space extension he was hoping for, but his formation feels cramped, as it is a little too close to Black's thickness.



*Dia. 3: keeping White separated*



*Dia. 4: alternative*




*Dia. 5: what White would like*


*Dia. 5.* KK: 'The result here is more like what White wants. This is clearly superior to *Dia. 4* and is just as good as *Dia. 1*.'

*Dia. 6.* 'Since White 1 is low, the high-handed move of Black 2, expanding his moyo, is conceivable. The continuation is a one-way street. Choosing among White 'a' to 'c' after 14 is perplexing. In a sense, this variation is frightening for both sides, because the play develops its own momentum and progresses rapidly. A resolute player like [the late] Kato Masao might play like this.'

The implication is that this doesn't suit Kobayashi's style.




*Dia. 6: frightening for both*



*Dia. 7: the difference between high and low*


*Dia. 7.* If Black makes a pincer at 2, White tries to settle his group with 3. If Black plays 4 to 8, cutting at 9 is possible, so White gets a good result. That's the difference from *Dia. 2*, in which 1 was located at 'a'.



*Dia. 8: the game*


*Dia. 8.* KK: 'The sequence to 12 followed in the game with Wang Wei. This was probably a new pattern. The bottom right turned into white territory, but I thought that swallowing up the white stone at 1 made this a reasonable result for Black.'






*Dia. 9: a good invasion*

*Dia. 9.* KK: 'After *Dia. 8*, White can aim at the good invasion of 1. Even if Black seals him in with 2, he can't hope to kill the group after 3 and 5. In the game, I compromised by playing 2 at 5.'



*Dia. 10: variation*

*Dia. 10.* KK: 'The same pattern subsequently appeared in a game with Cho Chikun (the only difference being the position of 9). Bearing in mind the possibility of *Dia. 9*, I made a change with 10 in order to forestall the invasion. I expected White 'a', letting Black play at 'b', but Cho promptly set his stone in motion with 11. This was a shrewd move, really typical of Cho.'



*Dia. 11: the game*

*Dia. 11.* The opening of the Cho game is shown here.

The theme of this instalment is a sober one, but it does serve to show how professionals are constantly tinkering with fuseki patterns.

(*Go Weekly*, 13 February 2006. The date notwithstanding, this issue was actually published on 5 February, just before the Kisei 3 game [page 19]. Translated by John Power.)

*Continued from page 31*

again, the sealed move! You couldn't have passed a pleasant night.

[MGW (parenthetical comment): Yamashita's review of the match and the commentary on the fourth game seem to show that he takes good moves for granted and remembers only the moves he regrets.

Yamashita is a 'graduate' of Kikuchi Yasuro's go school, the Ryokusei Gakuen, but we hear he hasn't been attending it recently. Actually we don't hear of his taking part in any study groups. We asked him about this.]

YK: It's hard to say which [group study or study by oneself] is better, but the latter seems to suit me more. Of course, there are times I seek

other people's opinions and want to practise by playing fast games. Actually I haven't thought deeply about this question. Maybe it's just that I'm a homebody.

[This interview continued, but we have run out of space. *Monthly Go World*, April 2006. Kisei report translated by John Power.]

#### Recent Kisei results

This list updates the one in *The Go Player's Almanac* 2001.

- 26th (2002). O Rissei 9-dan d. Ryu Shikun 7-dan 4-2.
- 27th (2003). Yamashita Keigo 7-dan d. O 4-1.
- 28th (2004). (Komi changed to 6½.) Hane Naoki 9-dan d. Yamashita 4-3.
- 29th (2005). Hane d. Yuki Satoshi 9-dan 4-3.
- 30th (2006). Yamashita d. Hane 4-0.

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# New Publication from Kiseido

## Mastering the Basics, Volume Four

### *501 Tesuji Problems*

*Compiled and written by Richard Bozulich*

Tesujis are skillful moves that accomplish some clear tactical objective, such as capturing stones or a group, rescuing one of your own groups linking up your stones, separating your opponent's stones, making good shape, etc.

There are two approaches to presenting tesujis problems. One approach is to collect problems according to the objective that tesujis accomplish. The other is to collect problems according to the kind of tesuji used. In this book the emphasis is on the latter.

There are about 45 different kinds of moves that make up tesujis. Each of these moves has a Japanese term that describes them. Some of these tesujis occur quite frequently in games, while others are seldom seen. In this book, I have attempted to present examples of every kind of tesuji. The more common ones occur in numerous problems, but even the less common ones will be represented a number of times. Every tesuji presented in this book can be found among the first 50 problems.

All of these different tesujis are scattered throughout the book. Just as in a game, one never knows what kind of tesuji will appear. It may be easy to find it, but often it is hard; it might be a quite common tesuji, but it could be one of those that rarely occur. Going through the 501 tesujis in this book will be like getting a tesuji experience in 501 games. In a game, however, many tesujis will go by unnoticed; in this book, each problem will be a learning experience.

Many of the problems are easy, but many are hard. I recommend that you make an effort to solve each problem before looking at the answer, but don't spend too much time on them. The important thing is to expose yourself to the tesuji. As you work your way through this book, you will find that the tesujis that solve the problems will appear to you more and more quickly. Once you have reached this level, the same thing will start happening in your games.

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